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I.

INTRODUCTION

Ang bayan kong Pilipinas...
Dayuhan ay nahalina
Bayan ko! Binihag ka
Nasadlak sa dusa.
My country, the Philippines.../Foreigners are enchantedby you/
My country! You were captured/And left in hardship.I
Although the United States granted independence to the
Philippines in 1946, the U.S. military has occupied the nation consistently
since 1898. 2 United States troops left the Philippines in 1992, leaving
behind a legacy of environmental disaster.3 But the U.S. soldiers had not
gone for good. The U.S. military returned to its former bases in the
Philippines the following year to embark on Balikatan,4 the annual joint
military exercises with the Philippine Armed Forces.5
1 "Bayan ko" was written in 1928. The nationalist anthem

was banned during

the 1970s, but resurrected in the 1980s by the masses at the EDSA/People Power
revolution. See DAVID JOEL STEINBERG, THE PHILIPPINES: A SINGULAR AND A PLURAL
PLACE 143 (4th ed. 2000).
2 See DONALD KIRK, LOOTED: THE PHILIPPINES AFTER THE BASES 7-20
(1999).

See also infra Part II.
3

See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., MILITARY BASE CLOSURES: U.S. FINANCIAL

OBLIGATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES 27-28, GAO/NSIAD-92-51 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter
GAO PHILIPPINES REPORT]. U.S. officials found contamination of toxic materials used

by the military in the soil and the drinking water in and around Subic Bay Naval Facility
and Clark Air Base. Id.
4 Although italics are used in formal writing to signal the use of a foreign
language within a text, I feel that the effect of this convention is only to interrupt the flow
of thoughts. Therefore, I will not be employing this writing custom. Compare WILLIAM
STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 81 (4th ed. 2000) (urging that the
use of a foreign language in writing is a "bad habit"), with GLORIA ANZALDIA,
BORDERLANDS/ LA FRONTERA: THE NEW MESTIZA (1987) (where the author writes

interchangeably in both her native languages, Spanish and English).
5 KIRK, supra note 2, at 192. Kirk describes the inaugural Balikatan exercise:
Strangely, however, a year after the last Americans had left Subic Bay,
joint exercises resumed under the rubric, "Balikatan" shoulder-toshoulder. The war games were a vestige of imperial glory that was.
From late 1993 to mid-1996, small elements of the U.S. Army, Navy
and Air Force coordinated with their Filipino counterparts, in order, as
a joint press release stated, "to enhance their joint capabilities to
respond to mutual defense efforts and civil military operations pursuant
to the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951."
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After President George W. Bush declared a War Against Terror in
September 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo announced her
whole-hearted support of the U.S.-led mission. 6
The Philippine
government demonstrated its alliance to the United States by making local
training facilities available to the U.S. military. 7 Thereafter, participants
in Balikatan focused on developing counter-terrorism techniques. 8 The
designation of these military operations as "joint activities" with the
Philippine Armed Forces is significant because current Department of
Defense (DoD) policy exempts cooperative efforts with other sovereigns
from the regulation of U.S. environmental laws. 9 As a result, no liability
scheme exists to protect the people of the Philippines from the dangers of
environmental degradation that will likely result from the ongoing war
games.
Displacing the responsibility for environmental harms in the way
that the United States and its DoD has done is anathema to international
law. For example, the United Nations Charter declares that the right to
non-discrimination is a fundamental human right and a basic element for
world peace. 10 Non-discrimination, or environmental justice, refers to the

Id. (citing to Press Release, RP-U.S. Mutual Defense Board, Media Release for
Combined Philippine/U.S. Exercise Balikatan '95 (Oct. 22, 1995)).
A joint command of the U.S. and Philippine militaries oversees Balikatan
exercises each year in different parts of the Philippines. In 2002, the Balikatan war
games took place in the southern part of the Philippines, in the Zamboanga and Basilan
areas. In 2003, observers expect the exercises to return to the Mindanao area, where the
terrorist organization, the Abu Sayyaf maintains its headquarters. See Exercise Balikatan,
at http://www. globalsecurity.org/military/ops/balikatan.htm (last visited June 17, 2003).
See also infra Part II.B (discussing the annual Balikatan exercises in detail).
6 Albert Del Rosario, A Progress Report on the Philippines: The Balikatan
Exercises, the Abu Sayyaf, and AI-Qaeda, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. (Mar.
19,
2002),
HERITAGE
LECTURES,
No.
738
at
1,
available
at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/HL738.cfm (last visited June 17,
2003). Ambassador del Rosario is the Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines to
the United States of America. Id. at 4. See also INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MISSION
AGAINST US ARMED INTERVENTION IN THE PHILIPPINES, BEHIND THE "SECOND FRONT"

71 (2002), available at http://www.ism2002.freeservers.com (last visited June 17, 2003)
[hereinafter SECOND FRONT].
7 See Del Rosario, supra note 6, at 2.
8 See Maricel Cruz, Lawmakers Thumb Down Sulu Balikatan, MANILA TIMES
(Apr.
11,
2003),
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2003/apr/1 /topstories/
20030411toplO.html (last visited June 17, 2003) (noting that since September 11, 2001,
the Balikatan exercises now concentrate on antiterrorism exercises and maneuvers).
9 See infra Part V.B.
10 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
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idea that fairness should be accorded to all persons and all groups, both
domestically and internationally. 1' Although the DoD takes a strong
policy stance regarding non-discrimination and the environment, in
practice, the DoD's assurances have proven to be little more than
pretense. 12 On overseas military installations, under official policy, the
U.S. military is supposed to follow the environmental regulations of the
United States or of the host-country, whichever are more stringent.' 3 In

To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.
Id. (emphasis added).
n In the United States, the non-discrimination principle has come to be known
as "environmental justice." The concept of environmental justice developed in protest
against the regular government practice of situating disproportionate numbers of
pollution disposal activities or other environmentally dangerous activities in areas
inhabited predominantly by people of color. See, e.g., UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST
COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
NATIONAL

REPORT

ON

THE

RACIAL

AND

SocIo-ECONOMIC

CHARACTERISTICS

OF

COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987) (detailing the practice of
environmental racism in the United States and encouraging the practice of environmental
stewardship); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND
THEIR

CORRELATION

WITH

RACIAL

AND

ECONOMIC

STATUS

OF

SURROUNDING

GAO/RCED-83-168, (June 1983) (providing "information on the racial
and economic characteristics of communities surrounding four hazardous waste landfills
in three southeastern States").
The idea that the disproportionate burden that
communities of color bear with regard to environmental risks is alternatively called
"environmental racism," in recognition of many environmental activists' ties to the civil
rights movement. See Ann E. Carlson & Jonathan Zasloff, Environmental Justice,
available at http://www.ioe.ucla.edu/publications/reportO1/EnvironmentalJustice.htm
(last visited June 17, 2003).
Through an executive order issued by President Bill Clinton, the concept of
environmental justice became a part of U.S. law and policy. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59
Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). President Clinton's Executive Order requires that "each
Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by
identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations in the United States and its territories[.]" Id.
12 See infra Part V.B.
13 See M. Victoria Bayoneto, Comment, The Former U.S. Bases in the
COMMUNITIES,

Philippines.-An Argument for the Application of U.S. Environmental Standards to
Overseas Military Bases, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 111, 113 (1994); Richard A. Phelps,
EnvironmentalLaw for Overseas Installations, 40 A.F. L. REv. 49, 49 (1996).
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fact, in violation of international expectations and norms,14 the DoD
applies neither U.S. nor Philippine law to its activities 15in the Philippines,
even when the difference between the two is negligible.
In this Comment I suggest that, upon entering a new agreement
with the United States for the Balikatan exercises, the Philippines is in a
legal position to insist on a comprehensive clean-up and remediation plan
for the extensive damage at the former U.S. military bases. Under a new
agreement, the Philippines can also address the pressing need to prevent
further degradation of the environment under the ongoing Balikatan
exercises. Nearly all U.S. military facilities require the use of hazardous,
sometimes ultra-hazardous, toxic substances. 6 United States government
reports establish that environmental degradation affecting at least two of
its former military bases in the Philippines, including contamination of the
drinking water and the threat of unexploded ordnance in and around the
former bases, is the direct result of U.S. military activity. 17 The U.S.
government is aware that its military activities caused substantial 18harm to
the environment, but denies any responsibility for the remediation.
14

See infra Part IV (discussing international environmental law principles such

as the non-discrimination norm, the prohibition against transboundary harm, and the
Polluter Pays Principle).
15 See Bayoneto, supra note 13, at 153. Bayoneto explains that no conflict
exists between U.S. and Philippine regulations because "Philippine environmental laws
are comprehensive, and are modeled on U.S. laws." Id. at 138 (citing to Teresa Albor, As

U.S. Vacates Philippines Bases, Toxic Wastes Remain,

SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,

Nov.

29, 1992, at A-46).
16 Ted H. Schettler, Reverberations of Militarism. Toxic Contamination, the

Environment, and

Health,

1

MED.

&

GLOBAL

SURVIVAL

7-18

(1995),

http://www.ippnw.org/MGSV2NISchettler.html (last visited June 17, 2003) [hereinafter
Schettler, Reverberations of Militarism].
17
SCHETTLER,

See

PAUL BLOOM, ALEX CARLOS,

ENVIRONMENTAL

AND

HEALTH

JORGE EMMANUEL

IMPACT

REPORT

ON

&

THEODORE

KNOWN

AND

POTENTIALLY KNOWN CONTAMINATED SITES AT FORMER U.S. MILITARY BASES IN THE

5-19 (1994) (on file with U.S. Working Group for Philippine Bases CleanUp, c/o Arc Ecology, 833 Market Street, Suite 1107, San Francisco, CA 94703)
[hereinafter BLOOM ET AL.]. Bloom and his co-authors used the two sets of documents
released by the DoD: (1) Potential Restoration Sites on Board the U.S. Facility, Subic
Bay, dated October 1992 and (2) Environmental Review of the Drawdown Activities at
Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines,not dated. Id. at 5. The DoD had redacted
some material from the reports before providing them to the authors. Id.
PHILIPPINES

18

GAO PHILIPPINES

REPORT,

supra note 3, at 5. The GAO

PHILIPPINES REPORT

concludes:
The services [U.S. Navy and Air Force officials] have identified contaminated
sites, such as fire-fighting training facilities and underground storage tanks. The
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In reviewing the terms of the Balikatan joint military exercises
each year, the Philippine government should negotiate a more equitable
cost of bringing all contaminated sites into compliance with U.S. environmental
standards could approach Superfund proportions, according to Air Force and
Navy officials. However, under the current agreement [the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement], the United States has no liability for this damage.
Id.
The United States relies on the bare terms of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement
to exculpate itself from liability. One scholar has noted that although the Military Bases
Agreement contained a "no repair" clause, it "did not give the United States carte blanche
to return the land contaminated with toxic waste." Bayoneto, supra note 13, at 125
(citing to Agreement Concerning Military Bases, Mar. 14, 1947, U.S.-Phil., art. XVII, §
2, 61 Stat. 4019, 4029-30 [hereinafter Military Bases Agreement]). Article XVII, section
2 provides in relevant part: "There shall be no obligation on the part of the United States
or of the Philippines to rebuild or repair any destruction or damage inflicted from any
cause whatsoever on any of the said buildings or structures owned or used by the United
States in the bases." Military Bases Agreement, art. XVII, § 2, 61 Stat. at 4027. The no
repair clause in Article XVI refers only to "buildings or structures" on the bases. Id.
Presumably, the Philippines bargained away its right to hold the United States
liable for any destruction or damage to the buildings for the right to keep the buildings
and any improvements at the expiration of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement. See
Margaret M. Carlson, Environmental Diplomacy: Analyzing Why the U.S. Navy Still
Falls Short Overseas, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 62, 82 (2000) (noting that in their SOFAs with
the United States, Japan and South Korea reached a similar compromise). Article XVII,
section 2 further provides:
The United States is not obligated to turn over the bases to the
Philippines at the expiration of this Agreement or the earlier
relinquishment of any bases in the condition in which they were at the
time of their occupation, nor is the Philippines obliged to make any
compensation to the United States for the improvements made in the
bases of for the buildings or structures left thereon, all of which shall
become the property of the Philippines upon the termination of the
Agreement or the earlier relinquishment by the United States of the
bases where the structures have been built.
Military Bases Agreement, art. XVII, § 2, 61 Stat. at 4027.
The "no repair" clause does not, however, exonerate the United States for the
injuries it caused to human health and the environment. See PHILIPPINE SENATE, 11TH
CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, COMMITTEE REPORT No. 237, ON Toxic CONTAMINATION IN
THE

FORMER

U.S.

BASES

IN

THE

PHILIPPINES

(2000),

available

at

http://yonip.com/toxicwaste/senate.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Senate
Report].
The Philippine Senate Committees on Environment and Natural Resources,
Health and Demography, and Foreign Relations clearly stated its official position: "No
article or section in the 1947 Military Bases Agreement or in its amendments referred to
any right or authority granted to the United States to inflict damage to the environment or
to commit toxic tort with impunity." Id.
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agreement with the United States. 19 A fair and balanced agreement would
require specific provisions detailing liability for potential environmental
degradation as a result of the joint exercises. The current military
activities in the Philippines will result in further damage to the
environment. 20 In order to achieve an equitable arrangement, the United
States must admit that it has a responsibility to remedy the hazardous
waste contamination at its former military bases in the Philippines. By
reviewing past wrongs and the effect of ecological harm on the human
inhabitants of the areas affected, both countries can move towards creating
a new, mutually acceptable covenant, in conformity with international
expectations of non-discrimination and equitable treatment.
Three
different sources of law are relevant to my analysis: international
environmental law, Philippine domestic law, and U.S. federal

environmental statutes.
Part II provides an abbreviated historical introduction to the
archipelago now known as the Republic of the Philippines. Although the
Philippines had always been a gathering place of diverse peoples, it was
not until the Spaniards arrived in Mactan, Cebu that a colonial history
began. 2 1 The colonial period continued after 1898, when the United States
inaugurated an era of imperial domination, military occupation, and social
and cultural control that still flourishes today.22 Although the Philippines
19 Each year before Balikatan resumes, the governments of the Philippines and

the United States agree to a Terms of Reference (TOR) regarding the rules that will
govern the joint military exercises. In the midst of ongoing controversies surrounding
Balikatan 2003-1, Philippine President Macapagal-Arroyo sent Avelino Cruz, Jr., Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, to Washington, D.C. to resolve arrangements for the 2003
TOR. President Macapagal-Arroyo stated that once finalized, she will review the 2003
TOR to ensure that it does not violate the Philippine Constitution. See Anthony Taberna,
GMA Wants Tighter Rein on Balikatan TOR, ABS-CBN NEWS.COM, June 6, 2003, at
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/abs news flash article.asp?FlashOID=9127 (last visited
June 4, 2003); Recto Mercene, Start of Balikatan in Limbo, ABS-CBN NEWS.COM, June
3, 2003, at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/abs news body.asp?section=Provincial&
oid=24748 (last visited June 4, 2003).
20 See infra Part II.B. See also SECOND FRONT annex B, supra note 6, at 85.
The Balikatan Watch human rights organization documented reports of U.S. military
planes dumping barrels of waste in coastal areas of Sulu. Id. Without an agreement
explicitly addressing liability for environmental damages, my fear is that the United
States will again be allowed to pollute in the Philippines with impunity.
See also infra Part III (describing the environmental disaster left by the U.S.
military when they vacated Subic and Clark).
21 See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 53-54.
22 See generally VESTIGES OF WAR: THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR AND THE
AFTERMATH OF AN IMPERIAL DREAM, 1899-1999 (Luis H. Francia & Angel Velasco
Shaw eds., 2003) (employing a multidisciplinary approach to critique the contemporary
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was granted independence from direct U.S. governance in 1946,23 the
constant presence of the U.S. military since that time undercuts the true
sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines. The control and authority
that the United States continues to exercise over the Philippines provides a
compelling historical reason why damage to the environment caused by
the U.S. military, as discussed in Part III, should be acknowledged and
paid for by the United States government.
In attempting to create a legal context for the United States'
liability for prospective and past damage to the environment in the
Philippines, Part IV outlines several principles of international
environmental law. This section covers a wide range of issues, including
the impact of environmental degradation on universally applicable human
rights, prohibitions on pollution, and liability regimes.
Although
international law contains many "soft" law provisions and therefore can be
criticized as having no force or effect, an analysis of the applicable
environmental laws of the United States in Part V will reveal that domestic
U.S. laws concerning the environment capture essentially the main
principles of international law. United States environmental statutes, such
as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
impose the same restrictions on pollution and the same duties for
remediation that are found in international as well as Philippine domestic
law.

24

consequences of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines). See also infra Part V.A.1 and
accompanying notes (relating a few examples of the influence and power that the United
States continues to enjoy in the Philippines today).
23

STANLEY KARNOW, IN OUR IMAGE: AMERICA'S EMPIRE 1N THE PHILIPPINES

335 (1989). In his chapter entitled "Dependent Independence," Kamow recounts the
historical and political forces that shaped the incipient Philippine Republic. See id. at
323-55. See also infra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
24 Philippine environmental laws incorporate many principles of international
law, most importantly, the Polluter-Pays Principle, which means that the party
responsible for pollution should be responsible for the clean-up. See infra Part IV and
accompanying notes.
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II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Many influences, colonial and otherwise, have shaped the unique
culture of the Philippine Islands. Long before the Spanish descended upon
Cebu in 1521, the various peoples who lived on the 7,200 islands that
make up the territory of the present-day Republic of the Philippines
involved themselves in sophisticated international relations. 25 The peoples
of the Philippine archipelago conducted regular international trade
between China, Japan, and even Portugal.26 Commerce among the
different regions of the archipelago was also well-established.27 The
concept of a Philippine nation did not yet exist, however, and each region
conducted its affairs independently.28
Spanish occupation marked the first colonial period in the
Philippines. 29 Darn Lapu Lapu and his warriors vanquished Ferdinand
Magellan in 1521, but more Spanish colonizers followed. 30 Armed with
sophisticated weapons and the Bible, Spanish conquerors quickly
cemented their rule over the Philippine Islands, which lasted for more than
300 years. 31 The shared experience of harsh Spanish colonial rule was
25

Two Muslim sultanates in the southern islands of Mindanao-Sulu and

Maguindanao-were great centers of government, trade, and culture.
INTERNATIONALIZATION

OF THE BANGSA MORO STRUGGLE

27 (1993).

SAMUEL

K.

TAN,

The sultanates

participated in the community of nations by entering into formal treaties with China,
Great Britain, the Netherlands, and even the United States. Wadja Esmula, Bangsa: The
Notion of Nationhood, in

CULTURE OF NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY PHILIPPINE

SOCIETY: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 121 (Cordillera Studies Center, 1995).
26
WILLIAM HENRY SCOTT, BARANGAY: SIXTEENTH-CENTURY PHILIPPINE
CULTURE AND SOCIETY 207
27 Id. at 208-09.
28

(4th ed. 1999).

Id. at 275. When the Spanish first came to the Philippine Islands in the

sixteenth century, a multitude of ethnolinguistic groups existed, each of which functioned
as an autonomous entity. However, historians and ethnographers note with awe that
although each unit was indeed separate, replete with individual languages, cultures, and
environments, a discernable "Philippine culture" had endured for at least three centuries
across most of the archipelago. Id.
29

See

RENATO CONSTANTINO, THE PHILIPPINES:

A

PAST REVISITED

12 (8th

prtg. 1984) [hereinafter CONSTANTINO, REVISITED]. Constantino noted wryly: "The
Filipino people have had the misfortune of being 'liberated' four times during their entire
history." Id. The Spanish instigated the first liberation "from the 'enslavement of the
devil'; the second was led by the Americans against the Spanish; the third, led by the
Japanese against the Americans; and the fourth and final liberation, led again by the
Americans against "the Japanese facists." Id.
30 Id. at 87.
31

See ROSALITA TOLIBAS-NUNEZ, ROOTS OF CONFLICT: MUSLIMS, CHRISTIANS,

AND THE MINDANAO STRUGGLE 10

(1997).
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actually the catalyst that galvanized the disparate peoples of the Philippine
Islands. Although previously fragmented, the Pilipino32 people were now
united by a common goal-independence from Spain-and the concept of
a Philippine nation was born. 33
In 1896, the Kagalanggalang
Kataastaasang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (Katipunan), an
underground organization, launched Asia's first revolution for national
liberation. 34 The revolutionary leaders were not aware, however, that
independence, once achieved, would be short-lived.
32

In this Comment, I use "Pilipino" to refer to the people living in the

Philippines. I use the adjective "Philippine" to identify non-person/al items, e.g., "the
Philippine Armed Forces." See Theo Gonzalves, "The Show Must Go On ": Production
Notes on the Pilipino Cultural Night, 2 HITTING CRITICAL MASS: A JOURNAL OF ASIAN
AMERICAN
CULTURAL
CRITICISM
(Spring
1995),
available
at

http://socrates.berkeley.edu/-critmass/v2n2/ gonzalvesprint.html (last visited June 5,
2003) (employing "Filipino" and "Filipino American"). A lively debate occasionally reenters Pilipino identity discourse, centering around the use of "P" versus "F." See
DOROTHY FUJITA-RONY, Note on Terminology, in AMERICAN WORKERS, COLONIAL
POWER: PHILIPPINE SEATTLE AND THE TRANSPACIFIC WEST xvii-xviii (2003).

Some

argue that since Tagalog (the national language of the Philippines) does not have an "F,"
using "Filipino" is an expendable vestige of Spanish and U.S. colonialism. See ROYAL F.
MORALES, MAKIBAKA: THE PILIPINO AMERICAN STRUGGLE (2d ed., 1998) (noting that

the "P" has a social significance rooted in the political and social movements of the
1960s);
Allan
G.
Aquino,
To
"P"
Or
Not
to
"P", at
http://paccoregon.net/Articles/PorF.php (last visited June 5, 2003) (explaining "the 'F' is
therefore 'colonial' and unsuitable for a new self-determined and decolonized identity").
Others note that using "P" is impolitic when modem languages in the Philippines have
incorporated the letter "F" and its pronunciation. See Penelope V. Flores, Pilipino Vs.
Filipino,at http://store.escalate.com/store/turoturo/articlel 1.jsp (last visited June 5, 2003)
(concluding that over "Pilipino" or "Philippino," "Filipino" is the most appropriate term).
Also, since "P(h)/Filipin(n)o/a" is derived from Las Islas Felipinas, named after King
Felipe II of Spain, perhaps the most revolutionary and de-colonial action would be to
come up with a completely different name. Most scholars have resolved that the choice
between "P" or "F" is a personal one. See Aquino, To "P" OrNot to "P ", supra note 32.
33

See

WILLIAM

J.

POMEROY,

COLLABORATION, AND RESISTANCE! 20 (1992).

THE

PHILIPPINES:

COLONIALISM,

Jose Rizal spearheaded a nationalist

organization called La Liga Filipina, and made the first call for unity of "the whole

archipelago into one compact vigorous and homogenous body." Id. Readers should note
that the solidarity cry organized by Rizal was a Tagalog revolutionary ideal, not
necessarily shared with the rest of the diverse peoples in the Philippine Archipelago. See,
e.g., TOLIBAS-NUf EZ, supra note 31, at 14-15 (indicating that, in 1899, an alliance
between the incipient Philippine Republic in Luzon and the sultanates in Mindanao still

did not exist).
34 Under the leadership of the Andres Bonifacio, the Katipunan led a successful
revolution and overthrew the Spanish colonial government.
Thereafter, the First
Philippine Republic was formed under the Malolos Constitution. See SECOND FRONT,
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When Pilipino revolutionaries finally forced the Spanish out, the
United States took advantage of an opportunity to betray its wartime
ally. 35 The United States made a secret deal with Spain, and thereafter
seized control of the Philippine Islands. 3 6 In 1898, the United States
began an occupation of the Philippines that was to last for more than a
century. 37 Thus began the second colonial period of the Philippines.
A.
Control

U.S.-Philippine Relations: Establishing Jurisdiction and

During treaty talks in Paris after the Spanish-American War, Spain
ceded the Philippines to the United States for US$20 million. 38 Eleven
days after the Treaty of Paris was signed, President William McKinley

supra note 6, at 92. For more on the development of the Malolos Republic, see SONIA M.
ZAIDE, THE PHILIPPINES: A UNIQUE NATION 263-77
35 See KARNOW, supra note 23, at 110.

(2d ed. 1999).

The United States and the nascent
Philippine Republic were allies during the Spanish-American War. During the midst of
the war, U.S. military officials were concerned only with the goal of defeating the
Spanish. "To achieve that goal, they sought the help of the Filipinos, indulging them
with pledges that had no foundation in reality. The Filipinos naYvely believed the
promises until they discovered, to their dismay, that they had been manipulated." Id. See
also id. at 113-14 (relating the difference between Philippine expectations and U.S.
promises ).
36 See POMEROY, supra note 33, at 1-2.
37 See KARNOW, supra note 23, at 436-42. On August 13, 1898, U.S. military
forces entered Manila. They did not leave until 1992. See ZAIDE, supra note 34, at 405.
38 Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754. The treaty also
granted the United States power over Guam and Puerto Rico. Id. at art. II. Spain
officially ceded "to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now
under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies." Id.
The Treaty of Paris signaled the United States' official introduction as a global
colonial power. In addition to the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam, the Treaty gave
the United States effective political control over Cuba. The United States had already
acquired the former Kingdom of Hawai'i by joint resolution of Congress earlier the same
year. See Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The
Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 226 (1996); Ediberto Roman &
Theron Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordination and Subjugation Under United
States Expansionism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437, 475-76 (2002).
See also KARNOW, supra note 23, at 129-30. Spain was willing to accept the
loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Guam, but Spanish officials argued that Spain could not
cede the Philippines because Spanish troops did not control the archipelago outside of the
city of Manila at the time of the U.S. capture. Id. at 130.
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39
issued a proclamation of Benevolent Assimilation to the Pilipinos.
McKinley ordered U.S. military forces, still in Manila, to use force to
pacify the Pilipinos. 40 Within weeks, the Philippine-American War
erupted. 4 1 The United States underestimated the resolve of the Pilipinos,
terming the revolution an "insurrection," expecting the fighting to last
only a few weeks. 42 In the end it took five years and 126,468 U.S. troops
to quash the Philippine Revolution.43
In 1934, the United States allowed the Philippines to become a
self-governing commonwealth, promising full independence in 1944.44
Independence was postponed, however, when Japan invaded and occupied
the Philippines during World War II. 45 The U.S. forces in Manila were
forced to evacuate and eventually regrouped in Australia.46 From Allied
Headquarters in Australia, General Douglas MacArthur organized the U.S.
military strategy in the Pacific. 47 Pilipino American soldiers serving in the
U.S. Army were smuggled into the Philippines to work as reconnaissance
scouts, clandestinely reporting on the movements of the Japanese
occupation forces. 48 The Hukbalahap, an underground socialist group,

39 CONSTANTINO, REVISITED, supra note 29, at 223. See also STEINBERG, supra

note 1, at 65. President McKinley's plan of "Benevolent Assimilation" towards the
Pilipinos was "to educate [them], and uplift and civilize and christianize them, and by
God's grace do the very best we could by them." Id.
40 CONSTANTINO, REVISITED,

supra note 29, at 223.

41 ZAIDE, supra note 34, at 268.
42 See id.
43 See id. at 268, 277. See also Renato Constantino, The Origin of a Myth, in
REDISCOVERY: ESSAYS IN PHILIPPINE LIFE AND CULTURE 99, 112 (Cynthia Nogales

Lumbera & Teresita Maceda eds., 1977).

The U.S. efforts to end the five-year long Philippine-American War cost more
than the war against Spain. "Thus a movement that had started as an effort to liberate the
Cubans [the Spanish-American War] ended in a drive to subjugate the Filipinos."
RICHARD HOFSTADTER ET AL., THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 340 (1959).

44 See POMEROY, supra note 33, at 86-87 (describing Independence Act which
allowed Philippine political self-governance while maintaining economic dependence on
the United States).
41 Id. at 101.
46 RENATO CONSTANTINO & LETIZIA R. CONSTANTINO, THE PHILIPPINES: THE

CONTINUING PAST 132-33 (prtg. 1984).
47 Id.

48 Linda A. Revilla, The 1st & 2nd Filipino Infantry Regiments, U.S. Army, in
HISTORY, HEROES, AND UNTOLD TRIUMPHS: FILIPINO AMERICANS AND WORLD WAR

Two (Linda A. Revilla ed. 2003). See also AN UNTOLD TRIUMPH: THE STORY OF THE
1ST AND 2ND FILIPINO INFANTRY REGIMENTS, U.S. ARMY (2002) (documenting the long-
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also helped to organize resistance against the Japanese, and aided U.S.
forces when they returned. 49 The United States defeated the Japanese
Imperial Army with the help of these two guerilla forces and thereafter set
50
about to fulfill the pledge for independence made before the war.
After 400 years of occupation by colonial forces, the Philippines
finally became an independent nation in 1946. 5 1 Despite the appearance
of complete independence, however, the United States installed a neocolonial rule with U.S. influence continuing to permeate throughout the

governance of the Philippines. 52 In 1947, U.S. negotiators gained the use
of twenty-three different military bases in the Philippines for a period of
ninety-nine years, free of rent. 53 Four years later, the two nations signed
the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951, which enshrined the
Philippine-U.S. security alliance. 54 Then, during the twenty-two years that

forgotten stories of Pilipino American soldiers who were instrumental in the U.S. victory
over the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II).
49 POMEROY, supra note 33, at 126, 131.
50 See id.
51 KIRK, supra note 2, at 7.
Philippine Congressman Satur C. Ocampo
describes the U.S. action as a grant of unsubstantial "flag independence." Satur C.
Ocampo, U.S. Armed Intervention in the Philippines and the People's Struggle for
NationalFreedom, in SECOND FRONT, supra note 6, at 67.
52 Id. See also KARNOW, supra note 23, at 323-24 (chronicling General
MacArthur's role in "perpetuating the dependent connection" between the United States
and the Philippines).
53 Military Bases Agreement, pmbl., art. 1, §§ 2-3, 61 Stat. at 4019-20.
54
Mutual Defense Treaty, Aug. 30, 1951, U.S.-Phil., available at
http://www.dfa.gov.ph/vfa/content/mdt. htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2003) [hereinafter
MDT].
Although the U.S. military has occupied Philippine bases under treaty since
1951, many different groups have expressed objections to the presence of a foreign
military in the Philippines. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 111. Philippine nationalist
leaders, as early as the 1940s, insisted that the 1947 Military Bases Agreement was a
violation of Philippine sovereignty. Senator Claro M. Recto asserted that U.S. bases on
Philippine soil were more likely to provoke outside attacks rather than to deter them. Id.
Karnow notes that, at the conclusion of the 1947 negotiations, even the most
"pro-American Filipinos" were opposed to the Military Bases Agreement. See KARNOW,
supra note 23, at 332. The Pro-American sect considered it an affront to the dignity of
the nation that the United States pursued harsher base acquisition tactics with the
Philippines, its longtime ally, than with Japan, a recent enemy. Id.
On December 26, 1984, future President of the Philippines Corazon Aquino
signed a Declaration of Unity demanding that: "Foreign military bases on Philippine
territory must be removed and no foreign military bases shall hereafter be allowed."
JOVITO R. SALONGA, THE SENATE THAT SAID No 191 (1995). The Declaration was co-
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Ferdinand E. Marcos was president, the United States provided aid and
assistance to the Philippine government, without which Marcos could not
have maintained his dictatorship.55 Through its control of Marcos, the
United States achieved many foreign policy objectives, the most important
of which was to retain a solid military presence in the Asia-Pacific
region. 56 The United States considered U.S. military bases in the
Philippines vital to U.S. national security interests during the Cold War,
since those
bases served as the launching pad for many anti-communist
57
missions.
The Military Bases Agreement of 1947 (MBA) expired in 1991
and that same year the Philippine Senate voted not to ratify a treaty that
would have extended its terms.58 In spite of the Senate rejection,
signed by Jaime Ongpin, Lorenzo Tahiada, Agapito "Butz" Aquino, Jose W. Diokno,
Raul S. Manglapus, Ramon V. Mitra, and Jovito R. Salonga. Id.
55
See KARNOW, supra note 23, at 375-78.
The Johnson and Nixon
administrations gave Marcos generous amounts of military and economic aid, a policy
designed to maintain Marcos' support of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. Id. In
exile, Marcos later blamed the U.S. government and the U.S. press for his downfall. Id.
at 410. Foreign policy experts noted: "the prevailing view of Marcos had long been
closer to Franklin D. Roosevelt's remark about Anastasio Somoza, the Nicaraguan
dictator of the 1930s: 'He may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch."' Id. at

388.
See also STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 176 (calling Marcos a "puppet" of the
United States); ZAIDE, supra note 34, at 388-89. Zaide maintains that during the Martial
Law period under Marcos, the Philippines attempted to develop an independent foreign
policy. Id. at 388. The Philippine government, however, granted the United States many
special privileges. Id. For example, the United States retained its military bases in the
Philippines, Subic and Clark being among the largest in Asia. Id.
56 See generally POMEROY, supra note 33, at 229-81 (discussing U.S. foreign
policy goals with respect to the strategic location of the Philippines).
57 See DONALD M. SNOW, NATIONAL SECURITY: ENDURING

PROBLEMS IN A

CHANGING DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT 173 (2d ed. 1991). See also SECOND FRONT, supra
note 6, at 67-68. The authors note that the United States initiated "hundreds of military
operations in 70 countries" from the Philippines. More specifically, the United States
used its military bases in the Philippines as "major staging areas" in the Korean and
Vietnam Wars. Id.
58
SALONGA, supra note 54, at 4-5. Dr. Jovito L. Salonga served as the
President of the Philippine Senate from 1987 to 1991. Salonga records, in precise detail,
the debates and policy arguments made and considered by the twelve senators in 1991
when faced with the option of indefinitely extending the terms of the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement. Id. at 191-292. Of particular importance to Salonga are the terms of the
1987 Constitution and the Bill of Rights contained therein. Id. at 9-16 (citing to PHIL.
CONST. art. III). Among the provisions in the 1987 Constitution are: a declaration to
pursue an independent foreign policy, PHIL. CONST. art. II, § 7; an adoption of a nuclear-
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representatives from the Philippines and the United States negotiated a
separate agreement allowing the United States continuing access to bases
in the Philippines for training and military preparedness. 59 On February
10, 1998, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon and
U.S. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard signed the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA). 6 0 The VFA grants continued access and control rights to the U.S.
armed forces. Under the VFA, U.S. military personnel are allowed to
enter and depart the Philippines exempt from the normal passport and visa
requirements. 6'
The VFA also establishes a scheme for criminal
jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. The Philippines is accorded the primary
and exclusive jurisdiction over U.S. personnel with respect to offenses
62
committed in the Philippines punishable under Philippine laws.
Additionally, both nations waive all civil liability
claims, which
63
torts.
environmental
for
apparently include claims
free policy, Id. § 8; and the recognition of the State's duty to "protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthy ecology," Id. § 17.
Many factors were considered by the Senate, not the least important of which
was the actual language of the proposed treaty. Quoting Alfredo Bengzon, a key
Philippine negotiator to that proposed treaty, Salonga notes that it was really the
"arrogant and heavy-handed insistence on squeezing out every possible advantage for the
United States that resulted in a treaty so lopsided and so iniquitous that the Senate justly
rejected it." SALONGA, supra note 54, at 290.
5'
AGREEMENT,

DEPARTMENT

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PRIMER

at http://www.

ON THE VISITING

dfa.gov.ph/vfa/content/Primer.htm

FORCES

[hereinafter

VFA

PRIMER].
60
Visiting Forces Agreement, Feb. 10, 1998, U.S.-Phil., available at
http://www.dfa.gov.ph/vfa/content/ Vfa.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2003) [hereinafter
VFA].
61
VFA, supra note 60, art. III, § 2. Article III also allows U.S. civilian
personnel to bypass the visa requirement, though they must present valid passports upon
entry and departure. Id. art. III, § 4.
62 See id. art. V, § 1. The section of the VFA providing for the exclusive and

primary jurisdiction of Philippine courts also contains a waiver clause. See id. art. V, §
3(c). Indeed, the Philippines did waive criminal jurisdiction over three U.S. Navy men in
2000. See infra Part V.A. 1.
61 VFA, art. VI, § 1. Both nations waive "any and all claims against
each other
for damage, loss or destruction to property of each other's armed forces or for death or
injury to their military and civilian personnel." Id.
The VFA is greatly beneficial to the United States, to the detriment of Philippine
interests. For example, the U.S. waiver of any civil claims it may have against the
Philippines is not a substantial relinquishment of rights. See id. In the environmental
context, the military operations under the VFA are all situated on Philippine soil making
the Philippines and its people the sole bearers of any adverse environmental burdens that
will result.
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Military bases in the Philippines remain essential to U.S. security
interests today. 64 In the Philippines, the U.S. military has an irreplaceable
strategic base from which missions can be launched into the South China
Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf.65 The United States
maintains a controlling presence in the Philippines today through millions
of dollars in foreign military assistance and humanitarian aid. The United
States currently has US$3.4 billion invested in the Philippines. 66 And in
2004, for example, the Philippines will receive US$87 million in "counterterror assistance" designed to strengthen internal counter-terrorism
capabilities, complete with
funding for U.S. military assistance and
67
training.
counter-terrorism
B.

They Shall Return. The Balikatan Exercises

Each year, the United States sends its troops to the Philippines to
engage in joint military exercises (war games) with the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. The joint effort has been dubbed Balikatan, Tagalog for
"shoulder to shoulder." 68 Under the current arrangement, the joint forces
conduct an average of ten to twelve military exercises each year. 69 The
first Balikatan exercises commenced in 1991.70 In 1995, the Philippine
government suspended the war games, due to the U.S. Pentagon's refusal
to submit its troops to the primary jurisdiction of Philippine courts, 7' but
64

See Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., The Philippine Bases and Status of Forces

Agreement: Lessons for the Future, 137 MIL. L. REv. 67, 82 (1992).
65

Id. See also SNOW, supra note 57, at 172-73 (noting that after World War II,

U.S. national security aims in Southwest Asia are defined by the "triple criteria of
protecting Israel's right to existence, guaranteeing the free flow of Persian Gulf
petroleum, and minimizing Soviet influence in the region").
6 VFA PRIMER, supra note 59.
67 The Philippines is now sixth on a list of twenty-five countries that the United
States has named "frontline states" on the war against terrorism. Felipe F. Salvosa, RP a
'FrontlineState' in Fight Against Terrorism-US Gov 't (Philippinesto Receive $87M in
Counter-TerrorAssistance), BUSINESSWORLD (Manila), Feb. 11, 2003, at P12, 2003 WL
4284191.
68

Although officially, "Balikatan" denotes only a special set of military

operations, in this paper, I will use "Balikatan" as a general descriptor for the myriad
U.S.-Philippine joint exercises that occur in the Philippines each year.
'9 VFA PRIMER, supra note 59.
70
John Pike, Balikatan:

"Shouldering the Load Together",

GLOBAL

SECURITY.ORG, at http://www. globalsecurity.org/military/ops/balikatan.htm (last visited
June 9, 2003).
71 KIRK, supra note 2, at 194.
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Balikatan resumed in 1999, over strong objection from several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well as the Catholic Church.72
The Balikatan 2002-1 war games series involved 1650 U.S.
73
soldiers, including 150 Special Forces troops.
The exercises were
conducted in Zamboanga and Basilan Island in southern Mindanao-the
stronghold of the Abu Sayyaf group.74 The international media noted that
this deployment was the largest gathering of U.S. troops after the success
of the joint mission with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan that
deposed the Taliban regime. 75 Unlike prior exercises, Balikatan 2002-1
was governed by a Terms of Reference (TOR), and not by the typical rules
of engagement. 76 The 2002-1 TOR allows U.S. military personnel to
advise, assist, and train Philippine units, but bans them from engaging in

72 Pike, supra note 70.
73 Id.

See also Professor Roland G. Simbulan, U.S. Military Intervention in the
Philippines: A New Phase, Lecture Before the Third World Studies Center and the
Institute of Islamic Studies, Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman Campus
(Feb. 7, 2002), at http://www.yonip.com/YONIP/Articles/war 01.htm (last visited Mar.
27, 2003). The U.S. Special Forces are an elite command cadre, consisting of elements
from the special operations forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The U.S. Special
Forces are now part of the Central Command of the U.S. Armed Forces, currently leading
the "war against terror" in the Middle East. Id.
74 See Del Rosario, supra note 6, at 2-3.
The Abu Sayyaf is reputedly
connected with the al-Qaeda terrorist network.
Id.
See also Paolo Pasicolan,
Strengthening the U.S.-Philippine Alliance for Fighting Terrorism, HERITAGE FOUND.
EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM

(Heritage Found., Wash., D.C.) No. 815, May 13, 2002, at 1,

available at http://www.heritage.org/library/execmemo/em815.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2003) (alleging links between al-Qaeda and the Abu Sayyaf).
Some background on the Heritage Foundation: "Some of the finest conservative
minds in America today do their work in The Heritage Foundation."
Heritage
Foundation
website,
Endorsement
statement
by
Rush
Limbaugh,
at
http://www.heritage.org/about! (last visited May 1, 2003). The Foundation's mission
statement provides:
Founded in 1973, The Heritage Foundation is a research and
educational institute - a think tank - whose mission is to formulate and
promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free
enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional
American values, and a strong national defense.
75 Bernardette S. Sto. Domingo & Friena P. Guerrero, Weekender Politics
Security, Rigodons, BUSrNESSWORLD (Manila), Dec. 27, 2002, at P21, 2002 WL
103399492.
76 Terms of Reference for RP-US Exercise Balikatan 02-1 (Feb. 9, 2002),
available at http://www. pacomm.mil/imagery/archive/0202photos/termsofreference.doc
(last visited June 7, 2003) [hereinafter TOR].
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direct combat.77 The only exception is that U.S. soldiers are allowed to
defend themselves if they come under attack.78
Various NGOs have mounted considerable protests against U.S.
military presence in the Philippines. 79 Philippine nationalist advocates8"
71 Id. art. I, §§ 6, 8. Article I, section 6 of the TOR provides: "The Exercise is a
mutual counter-terrorism advising, assisting and training Exercise relative to Philippine
efforts against the ASG [Abu Sayyaf Group], and will be conducted on the Island of
Basilan. Further advising, assisting and training exercises shall be conducted in
Malagutay and the Zamboanga area. Related activities in Cebu will be for support of the
Exercise." Id.
78 Id. art. I, § 8. "U.S. exercise participants shall not engage in combat, without
prejudice to their right of self-defense." Id.
The joint troops have had direct confrontations resulting in actual combat with
the Abu Sayyaf. During one such encounter in July 2002, joint forces killed Abu Sayyaf
spokesman Abu Sabaya. Later, Philippine Defense Secretary Angelo T. Reyes admitted
that the purpose of Balikatan 2002-1 was to eliminate the Abu Sayyaf and free foreign
nationals, including two Americans, who were being held hostage by the Abu Sayyaf.
Felipe F. Salvosa II & Cecille S. Visto, Defense Chief Favors New TOR,
BUSrNESSWORLD (Manila) Feb. 19, 2003, at P12, 2003 WL 4284769; Domingo &
Guerrero, supra note 75.
79 In 2002, an estimated 1000 protestors gathered in front of the U.S. Embassy
in Manila to protest the continued occupation of the U.S. military of the Philippines in the
form of the annual Balikatan exercises. Militants Stage Biggest Protest Action Vs. War
Games (Feb. 4, 2002), available at http://www.inq7.net/brk/2002/feb/04/ brkpol 8-1.htm
(last visited May 31, 2003). See also SECOND FRONT, supra note 6, at 9-15 (reporting on
the International Solidarity Mission (ISM) Against U.S. Armed Intervention in the
Philippines which took place on July 24-31, 2002 in Mindanao). The ISM was sponsored
by Bayan Muna (People First Party), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan, New
Patriotic Alliance), Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights), and
the Moro-Christian People's Alliance. See id. at 4.
Protestors allege that the presence of U.S. troops in war-torn Mindanao not only
violates the Philippine Constitution, but could also lead to direct U.S. intervention in
domestic Philippine affairs. Luis Jalandoni, international representative of the National
Democratic Front, recently spoke out against Balikatan and warned, "the United States
could use the Balikatan military exercises to 'provoke another Tonkin Gulf incident' that
'could lead to another U.S. war of aggression."' Jaime Espina, NDF Warns Vs. Repeat of
Tonkin Gulf "Attack" in Balkatan, ABS-CBNNEwS.COM, May, 28, 2003, at
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/abs news body.asp?section Provincial &oid 24229 (last
visited June 5, 2003). Philippine Supreme Court Associate Justice Santiago Kapunan had
previously expressed this same concern. See Lim v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
151445
(Apr.
11,
2002,
J.
Kapunan
dissenting),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/2002/apr2002/151445 kapunan.htm (last visited Apr. 5,
2003) [hereinafter Lim Opinion, Dissent] (describing the Gulf of Tonkin incident).
80 A number of non-governmental organizations in both the Philippines and the
United States can be characterized as "Philippine nationalist" in nature. See, e.g., Junk
the VFA Movement, Junk the Visiting Forces Agreement (Sept. 10, 1998), at
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argue that Balikatan violates the Philippine Constitution, which forbids
foreign troops from amassing on Philippine soil absent a treaty ratified by
a two-thirds Senate majority. 8 1 The Philippine Constitution specifically
states that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
82
in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate."
The Philippine President has not yet approached the Senate for its advice
or consent regarding the annual Balikatan war games.83
Both Philippine and U.S. officials try to differentiate the Balikatan
exercises from a "permanent" foreign military presence necessitating
ratification by the Philippine Senate. The Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) of 1998 provides the legal basis of the current U.S. presence in the
Philippines. 84 Proponents of the VFA argue this arrangement can bypass
the constitutional requirement of consent from the Philippine Senate
because of a separate treaty arrangement with the United States under the
Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 (MDT). 85 The DoD maintains that since
the U.S. troops will not be based in the Philippines, but train only there on

http://makabayan.tripod.com/junkvfa.htm (last visited May 31, 2003) (stating the purpose
of the Junk the VFA Movement); Network in Solidarity with the People of the
Philippines
(NISPOP),
Uphold
Philippine
Sovereignty!,
at
http://www.nispop.org/outnowstatement.html (last visited May 31, 2003) (describing
NISPOP's coalition work in supporting Philippine sovereignty with other organizations,
such as the League of Filipino Students, the First Quarter Storm Movement, and various
members of the Catholic clergy).
81 PHIL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 25. The Constitution prohibits the presence of
foreign military troops in the Philippines:
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of
the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military
bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in
the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate
and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contacting State.
Id.
82

Id.

83

The 2003 Balikatan exercises, as have each of the joint exercises preceding it,

operate under the auspices of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 (MDT) and the Visiting
Forces Agreement of 1998 (VFA). See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes. In the
eyes of the U.S. government, the VFA is not a "treaty," only an "executive agreement."
SECOND FRONT, supra note 6, at 36, 70.
14 VFA, supra note 60.
85 MDT, supra note 54. Article VI of the MDT obligates both the Philippines
and the United States to act and meet common dangers "in the event of an armed attack
in the Pacific Area." Id. art. VI.
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a "temporary duty"
basis, the annual deployment does not violate any
86
laws.
Philippine
In April 2002, the Supreme Court of the Philippines held the
Balikatan exercises are legal, and found President Macapagal-Arroyo did
not commit a grave abuse of discretion in facilitating the deployment of
U.S. troops in Mindanao for the Balikatan 2002-1 series. 87 Philippine
citizen-taxpayers and former Integrated Bar of the Philippines officials
Arthur D. Lim and Paulino R. Ersando % filed a petition for prohibition in
the
Supreme
Court, arguing
the Balikatan
exercises
were
unconstitutional. 89 Interestingly, the Court first noted that although the
petitioners did not have standing, the procedural requirement would be
relaxed because of the "transcendental importance" of the issue
involved. 90 In the Court's words, the issue at hand was "the VFA permits
United States personnel to engage in 'activities,' the exact meaning of
which was left undefined."9 1 The majority, led by Justice Sabino de Leon,
Jr., 92 held the Balikatan 2002-1 exercises were legal and covered under the
scope of both the 1951 MDT and the 1998 VFA. 93 The Court reasoned
simply, "it is only logical to assume that 'Balikatan 02-1,' a 'mutual antiterrorism advising, assisting and training exercise,' falls under the
86 VFA PRIMER, supra note 59.
7 Lim v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 151445 (Apr. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.supremecourt. gov.ph/2002/apr2002/151445.htm (last visited June 19, 2003)
[hereinafter Lim Opinion]. See also Askia Muhammed, R.P. Supreme Court: Balikatan
Legal,
THE
PHILIPPINE
NEWS,
Apr.
25,
2002,
available
at
http://news.ncmonline.com/news/view-article.html?article-id 178 (last visited June 19,
2003); Michael Lim Ubac, Supreme Court Rules RP- U.S. War Games Legal, INQUIRER
NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 12, 2002, at http://www.inq7.net/ nat/2002/apr/12/text/nat_21-p.htm
(last visited Mar. 11, 2003) (reporting on the Lim decision).
88 Lim Ubac, supra note 87.
89 Id.
90 Id.

"[I]n cases of transcendental importance, the court may relax the standing

requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review." Id. (citing to Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr., 232
SCRA 110 (1994)).
91 Id. (citing to VFA, supra note 60, art. 1) (providing definitions for terms used
in the Visiting Forces Agreement)).
92 Joining Justice de Leon's majority opinion were Chief Justice Hilario Davide
Jr. and Associate Justices Josue Bellosillo, Jose Melo, Reynato Puno, Jose Vitug, Vicente
Mendoza, Artemio Panganiban, Leonardo Quisumbing, and Antonio Carpio. Lim Ubac,
supra note 87. Associate Justice Santiago Kapunan wrote a dissenting opinion, with
Associate Justices Consuelo Ynarez-Santiago and Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez joining
him. See Lim Opinion, Dissent, supra note 79.
9' Lim Opinion, supra note 87.
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umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities" under the VFA.94 The
Court also noted, however, no agreement between the United States and
the Philippines allows foreign troops to engage in an offensive war in the
Philippines. 95
The Court did not entertain the petitioners' final
argument-that U.S. troops were in fact actively engaged in combat
"under the guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise." 96 The
Court held that because it is not a trier of fact, it was97constrained to limit
its ruling to the issue of executive abuse of discretion.
94 Id.
95 Id.

The court mused about the offensive war issue without coming to a legal

ruling:
That is not the end of the matter, though. Granted that "Balikatan 021" is permitted under the terms of the VFA, what may U.S. forces
legitimately do in furtherance of their aim to provide advice, assistance
and training in the global effort against terrorism? Differently phrased,
may American troops actually engage in combat in Philippine territory?
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I
stipulates that U.S. exercise participants may not engage in combat
"except in self-defense."
We wryly note that this sentiment is
admirable in the abstract but difficult in implementation. The target of
"Balikatan 02-1," the Abu Sayyaf, cannot reasonably be expected to sit
idly by while the battle is brought to their very doorstep. They cannot
be expected to pick and choose their targets for they will not have the
luxury of doing so. We state this point if only to signify our awareness
that the parties will straddle a fine line, observing the honored legal
maxim "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per
directum" ["no one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to
do directly"].
Id.
96 Id.

Disposing of the plaintiffs claim by concluding that the Supreme Court
of the Philippines is not a trier of fact seems to me to contradict the first statement made
by the Court, brushing aside the procedural standing requirement.
97 id.
Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops actively engaged
in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged
training and assistance exercise? Contrary to what petitioners would
have us to, we cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring
down south, as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As
a rule, we do not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per
se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality,
but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance
with the rules of evidence.
. . It is all too apparent that the
determination thereof involves basically a question of fact. On this
point, we must concur with the Solicitor General that the present
subject matter is not a fit topic for a special civil action for certiorari.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Having passed judicial scrutiny, Balikatan 2003 was scheduled to
commence in April 2003.98 The desire to host U.S. troops is, in large part,
motivated by the expectation of financial investment that usually
accompanies U.S. presence. On March 28, 2003, in the midst of the
ongoing negotiations about the 2003 Balikatan war games, the U.S.
government donated US$5.3 million in medical equipment and US$1
million in medical supplies to a Jolo community hospital. 99 President
Macapagal-Arroyo insisted that the donation was not a quid pro quo, but
local reporters highlighted the ulterior motive.100 United States officials
used the donation to give the Jolo residents an economic incentive to
hosting the war games, "an idea of what may be in store for them, should
they host Balikatan 03-1."' 1"1 This exchange demonstrates the power the
United States can exert in the Philippines through foreign aid.
The current presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines poses a real
threat to human health and the environment. No environmental impact
statements have been conducted for the 2003 Balikatan exercises,
therefore neither the Philippines nor the United States has an official or
publicly available estimate of environmental damages that the war games
may cause. 102 I believe that the potential for future harm is best measured
by reviewing the specific and quantifiable environmental damages done to
two former U.S. military bases in the Philippines-Subic Bay Navy
Facility (Subic) and the Clark Air Base (Clark).

III.

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES
IN THE PHILIPPINES

98 Salvosa, FrontlineState, supra note 67. In 2003, at least twelve PhilippineU.S. joint exercises are scheduled. Id.
99 Mia Gonzalez, R.P.-U.S. Exercise Will Still Be in Sulu GMA, ABSCBNNEWS.CoM, Apr. 9, 2003, at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/abs body.asp?
section National&oid 20312 (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
100Id.

'0'Mia Gonzalez, Sulu Folk Get U.S. Medical Supplies, Equipment, ABSCBNNEWS.COM,

Mar.

28,

2003,

at

http://www.abs-abnnews.com/

Abs cbn body.asp?section Provincial&oid 19312 (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
102
Instead, NGOs in the Philippines observe and report on the various
environmental concerns raised by the ongoing joint military exercises. See infra Part III
and accompanying notes.
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When U.S. troops left the Philippines in the early 1990s, the DoD
relinquished all responsibility for the huge environmental cleanup task that
remained as a result of its presence at Subic and Clark. 103 The U.S.
military dumped millions of gallons of sewage on the ground and in the
water, and the chemicals have seeped into the soil and water table.10 4 In
1992, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated the clean-up
would cost more than $12-15 million per site.' 0 5 Nearly all U.S. foreign
military bases share this story. 10 6 The environmental hazards that exist on
each U.S. military base are numerous, including toxic waste, hazardous
103

See GAO PHILIPPINES

REPORT,

supra note 3, at 3.

The Air Force and Navy have identified significant environmental
damage to their facilities in the Philippines. However, the current

basing agreement does not impose any well-defined environmental
responsibility upon the United States either while it operates the bases
or for cleanup upon withdrawal. Nevertheless, Air Force and Navy
officials said that if the United States applied U.S. Environmental
restoration standards, cleanup and restoration costs could approach
Superfund proportions [averaging $25 million per site].
Id.
See generally BLOOM, ET AL., supra note 17; Videotape: Toxic Sunset: On the
Trail of Hazardous Waste From Subic and Clark (Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism 1993) (on file with University of Hawai'i Wong Audiovisual Center).
For a complete timeline of events regarding the environmental damage at the
former U.S. military bases in the Philippines, see People's Task Force on Bases CleanUp, Chronology of Events Related to the Struggle for Environmental Justice at the
Former Bases in the Philippines, available at http://www.boondocksnet.com/
centennial/sctexts/bases env chron.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2003) [hereinafter
CHRONOLOGY]. The CHRONOLOGY reveals that U.S. officials knew of the environmental
damages as early as June 1986, five years before the 1947 Military Bases Agreement
expired. Id. A classified report by the DoD records "serious disposal problems" in U.S.
military waste management in the Philippines. Id. Furthermore, although the U.S. Air
Force conducted an environmental review of Clark, it did not give a copy to the
Philippine government before vacating the base. Id.
104 GAO PHILIPPINES REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
105 Bayoneto, supra note 13, at 112 (citing to GAO PHILIPPINES REPORT, supra
note 3, at 28).
106

See Schettler, Reverberations of Militarism, supra note 16.

Dr. Schettler

writes: "The mission of virtually every U.S. military facility has required the use of
hazardous, toxic substances by military personnel and military contractors over the
course of decades." Id. See also J. Martin Wagner & Neil A.F. Popovic, Environmental
Injustice on United States Bases in Panama. InternationalLaw and the Right to Land
Free From Contamination and Explosives, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 401, 425 (1998) (citing to
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS CONTINUE AT
OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES 4, 45, GAO/NSIAD-91-231 (1991)).
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chemicals, and explosive materials. 10 7 Yet, there is a marked difference in
the way the U.S. government has chosen to deal with its cleanup duties in
the Philippines compared to the duties08it has voluntarily shouldered in
developed countries, such as Germany.'
Just before the 1947 Military Bases Agreement expired in 1991,
the U.S. Senate commissioned the General Accounting Office (GAO) to
determine the nature of any environmental damages on military facilities
in the Philippines and whether the United States had any obligation to
cleanup or to restore the bases.' 09 The GAO concluded the United States
had no liability. 110 This conclusion is astonishing because the report also
acknowledged that U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy officials had identified
"significant environmental damage[s]" at both Clark and Subic that did
not comply with U.S. environmental standards. 1 ' The environmental
107

Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 423.

108 See Michael Satchell, What the Military Left Behind Toxic Legacy; Angeles

City, Philippines, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 24, 2000, available at 2000 WL
7717357. U.S. News reported that "[this year, the DOD will spend $2 billion on
cleaning up at installations in the United States and its territories, but only $18.6 million
in Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Japan, and South Korea. The Philippines gets
nothing." Id.
109 GAO PHILIPPINES REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-2. See also CHRONOLOGY,
supra note 103. The GAO report was commissioned in 1990, but Dr. Jorge Emmanuel
later discovered that the DoD knew about the environmental damage on the bases as early
as 1986. Id. A classified report by the DoD Defense Inspector General revealed the
health risks and environmental dangers associated with poor hazardous waste
management by the U.S. military were present in 1986, but this information was kept
secret from the Philippine government. Id.
110 GAO PHILIPPINES REPORT, supra note 3, at 5, 27. The report's authors
conclude:
Although the Air Force and the Navy have identified significant
environmental damage at both Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Navy
Facility, the current basing agreement does not impose any welldefined environmental responsibility on the United States for
environmental cleanup and restoration.
Id. at 27.
311 Id. "Environmental officers at both Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Navy
Facility have identified contaminated sites and facilities that would not be in compliance
with U.S. environmental standards." Id. The GAO PHILIPPINES REPORT describes in
detail some of the "significant environmental damage[]" sites that U.S. Navy and Air
Force environmental officials had identified. Id. at 27-28. For example:
The Subic Bay Navy Facility's power plant contains unknown
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) and emits untreated pollutants directly
into the air. No testing has been performed to analyze the content of
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problems listed in the report are directly related to the daily operations of
the military on those bases. For instance, since the Subic Facility did not
have a complete sanitary sewer system and waste treatment facility,
sewage and waste from the complex were discharged directly into Subic
Bay. 112 The full extent of these environmental damages was never
measured, since the United States never conducted testing in the
3
contaminated areas.1
University of Maryland scientists, however, conducted a
comprehensive study of the Clark and Subic sites in 1993.114 The study
analyzed soil, water, and air samples from Clark and found traces of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), heavy metals, and high concentrations
of a pesticide. 115 The Philippine government later commissioned U.S.based consulting firm, Weston International, to perform a baseline study
of the soil and water at Clark. 116 Among other things, the Weston study
confirmed that: (1) at least one pollutant (including mercury, lead,
pesticide dieldrin, benzene, and toluene) existed in twenty-one test sites
and none of these sites met drinking water standards; 117 (2) unsafe levels
of contaminants remained in the soil at thirteen different test sites;1 18 and
emissions, but officials stated that air emissions would not meet U.S.
clean air standards.
Id. at 28.
112

Id. at 27.

113 Id.

Bayoneto, supra note 13, at 122 (citing to Larry LaMotte, Military Mess
Part 4: Third World Peoples Suffer (CNN Specials television broadcast, Nov. 7, 1993),
available in LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File)).
115 Id. Some of the aforementioned chemicals are Persistent Organic Pollutants
(POPs), which scientific research has linked to various health problems including falling
sperm count, testicular and breast cancer, behavioral disorders, and immune system
deficiencies.
Aimee Suzara, Facing the Toxic Legacy: A Personal Encounter, in
MAGANDA MAGAZINE 63 (1999). The Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999 defines POPs as
"the organic compounds that persist in the environment, bioaccumulate through the food
web, and pose a risk of causing adverse effects to human health and the environment.
These compounds resist photolytic, chemical and biological degradation, which shall
include but not be limited to dioxin, furan, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),
organochlorine pesticides, such as aldrin, dieldrin, DDT, hexachlorobenzene, lindane,
toxaphere and chlordane." Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999, Republic Act No. 8749, ch.
114

1, art. 2, § 5(s).
116 Suzara, supra note 115, at 63.
117

Id. Each of these pollutants "ha[s] been linked to health conditions such as

birth defects, tumors, cancers, and seizures. Benzene and various pesticides have been
connected to leukemia." Id.
118 Id.
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(3) many of119these test sites were located within or very close to
communities.
When Mount Pinatubo erupted in 1991, about 20,000 families
were relocated to the recently vacated Clark Air Base Command
(CABCOM). 120 The U.S. military had used the facilities inhabited by the
dislocated families as a motor pool. 121 Soon after the relocated groups
took up their temporary residence at CABCOM, reports of vomiting,
diarrhea, respiratory problems, and miscarriages began to rise. 122 A
subsequent study of twelve barangays 123 surrounding Clark found that
these communities had unusually high rates of female urinary tract
infections and nervous system disorders.124 Today, children conceived or
born at Clark are afflicted with conditions such as congenital heart disease,
seizure disorders, and other debilitating birth defects. 25 These conditions
provide undeniable evidence of the horrible effects that poorly regulated
military activities can have on human safety.
Today, both U.S. and Philippine officials, aware of the
environmental contamination in and around former U.S. military bases in
the Philippines, have not yet repaired the contaminated areas. 126 The
public health risks associated with the toxic pollution continue to plague

Id.

119

120

Satchell, supra note 108. In 1991, Mount Pinatubo erupted, spewing rain

and volcanic ash across 2000 acres of the Philippine countryside. The eruption left 1.2
million people homeless and was one of the primary motivations in the U.S. military's
swift retreat from Clark. Although the eruption rendered Clark "virtually useless" to the
U.S. military, Philippine official in charge of relocating the thousands displaced by the
natural disaster decided to use CABCOM as the main resettlement site. See STEINBERG,
supra note 1, at 12, 178-79.
121Suzara, supra note 115, at 63.
122 Id. at 64.

123 The "barangay" is the smallest unit of government in the Philippines.
supra note 26, at 5. A barangay is roughly equivalent to the "barrio" in Mexico
or a "town" or "hamlet" in the United States.
124 Suzara, supra note 115, at 64 (citing to a comprehensive health survey
conducted by Canadian Institute for the Concern for Public Health).
SCOTT,

125

Id. at 65.

126 See Ted H. Schettler, Military Base Contamination in the Philippines. The
U.S.
Role,
1
MED.
&
GLOBAL
SURVIVAL
7-18
(1995),
http://www.ippnw.org/MGSV2NlSchettler.html (last visited June 17, 2003) [hereinafter
Schettler, Military Base Contamination]. "At the present time rusting and bulging barrels
of hazardous material are sitting uncovered at Clark." Id. See also Toxic Sunset, supra
note 110 (filming some of these leaking canisters).
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the surrounding communities. 127
The current Balikatan military
operations, being conducted under a "joint command" of U.S. and
Philippine military officials, threatens to exacerbate the environmental
conditions that have caused the death of many Pilipinos.128 Recent reports
indicate that the Balikatan exercises may take a serious toll on the
environment and the people in the Philippines.
On March 23, 2002, residents of Bundok Sinomaan, Patikul, Sulu
reported that a U.S. plane dropped a silver coated drum barrel. 129 The
inhabitants evacuated the surrounding area, fearing that the barrel may
contain explosives or chemical wastes. 130 Less than three weeks later,
Basilan Governor Wahab Akbar complained that U.S. spy planes dropped
more barrels into the coastal waters of Sumisip town. Soon after, the
reported drops, children in the area experienced nausea, vomiting, and
diarrhea. 131 Representative Hussin Amin of Sulu provided a more specific
account of similar activities affecting three towns in his province.132 Amin
announced that "U.S. P3 Orion planes were dropping what appeared to be
drums of toxic chemicals." 133 The United States responded through
spokesperson Major Cynthia Terramae, who denied the allegations and
challenged Representative Amin to produce evidence to the contrary.134
Reports like these illustrate the urgent need to establish specific
environmental guidelines to which the Balikatan military command must
adhere. Principles of international environmental law, establishing duties
and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, provide an important
and very relevant starting place. The environment is, by its very nature, of

127

See Schettler, Military Base Contamination, supra note 126. Dr. Schettler

wrote in 1995: "Meanwhile, as the political resolution of this issue unfolds, thousands of
Filipinos, many of whom are living in marginal refugee conditions, are drinking and
bathing in water that is contaminated with hazardous substances resulting from U.S.
military activities." Id. Moreover, residents around Subic eat fish and shellfish harvested
from Subic Bay, the waters of which were, for years, the dumping ground of the U.S.

Navy's shipyards. Id.
128 SECOND FRONT,
129

130

supra note 6, at 89, 105.

Id.
Id. at 89.

132

at 89.
Patikul, Luuk, and Indanan are the Sulu three towns mentioned by Amin. Id.

133

Id.

134

Id.

131 -d.
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international concern. 135 Water and wind currents can transport the
impact
136
globe.
the
throughout
incident
environmental
of a seemingly local
IV.

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRINCIPLES

International law provides both general and specific norms that
govern the protection of the environment.' 37 General principles of
international law have been incorporated into the domestic law of many
nations, including both the Philippines and the United States. The
environmental laws of the Philippines reflect various doctrines 1of
38
international environmental law, including the Polluter Pays Principle.
The United States also recognizes international law as domestic law in
appropriate circumstances.' 39 Therefore, the United States may be bound,
by customary international law and written international conventions, to
pay the environmental remediation costs for its former military bases in
135 Stanley W. Spracker & Ethan S. Naftalin, Applying Procedural
Requirements of U.S. EnvironmentalLaws to Foreign Ventures: A Growing Challenge to
Business, 25 INT'L LAW. 1043, 1051-52 (1991).
136 See, e.g., Terry Hall, "... CarriedBy the Wind Out to Sea" Ireland and the

Isle of Man v. Sellafield."Anatomy of a TransboundaryPollution Dispute, 6 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 639, 654 (1994); Schettler, Reverberations of Militarism, supra note 16
(discussing the transmigration of environmental damage through wind and water
currents).
137 See infra Parts IV.A-C. (discussing various international law conventions
and customary laws including the U.N. Charter, the Rio Declaration, the nondiscrimination principle, and the Polluter Pays Principle).
138 The environmental laws of the Philippines utilize the Polluter Pays Principle
to assign liability for violations of environmental regulations.
The Philippine
Environmental Code, effective as of 1977, affirms: "It shall be the responsibility of the
polluter to contain, remove and clean-up .

.

. pollution incidents at his own expense."

Presidential Decree No. 1152, Philippine Environment Code of 1977 § 20 (June 6, 1977)
(Phil.).
139 See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (holding that, in the
absence of congressional enactment, federal courts are "bound by the law of nations,
which is a part of the law of the land"); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
During the Spanish-American War, U.S. Navy ships seized as war prizes two Cuban
fishing smacks flying Spanish flags. The fishing vessels were thereafter sold at auction.
The United States Supreme Court held that international law prohibited the taking of
fishing vessels as prizes of war. More importantly, the Court explicitly stated that:
"International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for determination." Id. at 700. See also infra at Part IV.A
(discussing the domestic applicability of international environmental law in the United
States).
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the Philippines. The current presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines,
albeit on a "temporary" basis, 14 0 reinforces the urgent need for the United
States to acknowledge its duties under international law.
General principles found in international law provide a
comprehensive framework for analyzing and assessing State responsibility
for environmental degradation. This section addresses three elements of
this framework. First, each State has a duty to apply environmental
regulations even-handedly without discriminating on the basis of
citizenship, national origin, or state of development. 14 1 The United States
has breached this duty through its policy of non-responsibility in the
Philippines. Second, countries have a further duty to use their resources in
140 See

BAYAN v. Zamora, 32 SCRA 449 (2000) (J. Puno, Dissenting),

available at http://www.yonip.com/YONIP/Articles/dissenting.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2003). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno found that the war games that U.S. and
Philippine troops engage in each year under the auspices of the VFA are not "temporary"
and are thus violative of Article XVIII, section 25 of the Philippine Constitution. Justice
Puno cites to an intriguing exchange between Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. and
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon during the public hearings on the VFA
regarding the semantics of the word "temporary."
Sen. Pimental:

. . . In other words, this kind of activities are not designed to

last only within one year, for example, the various visits that can cover eternity
until the treaty is abrogated?
Mr. Siazon:
Well, your honor, this is an exercise for the protection of
national security, and until conditions are such that there is no longer a possible
threat to our national security, then you will have to continue exercising, Your
Honor, because we cannot take a chance on it.
Sen. Pimentel:
temporary?

So, this will be temporary permanent, or permanently

Mr. Siazon:

Permanently temporary, Your Honor.

Id. (citing to Transcript of Committee Meeting, Committee on Foreign Relations, at 21
(Jan. 26, 1999)).
141 See infra Part IV.A. The idea that general non-discrimination principles in
international law are applicable and appropriate in the environmental law context is not
new. In their article on environmental justice and U.S. bases in Panama, Wagner and
Popovic provide a conceptual outline of the development of the right to nondiscrimination, as between nations, in regards to domestic and international
environmental policy-making. Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 423-26, 489-92
(citing to, among others, Anne F. Badefsky, The Principal of Equality or NonDiscriminationin InternationalLaw, 11 HuM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1990)).
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a manner that avoids transboundary harm. 142 The U.S. military previously
breached this duty by allowing toxic contamination to leak into the soil
and water on its former military bases in the Philippines. 143 Current U.S.
military activity under Balikatan poses the same threat. Third and finally,
the Polluter Pays Principle assigns liability for these two breaches of
established international environmental law duties: the United States must
pay for the environmental cleanup at the sites already damaged and
assume responsibility for future environmental damage in the Philippines
during the Balikatan exercises.144
A.

Duty and Breach: Application of Different Environmental
Standards as a Violation of InternationalLaw

In its treatment of former military bases in the Philippines, the
United States has utilized a double standard for the application of its
environmental laws. The U.S. government has failed to treat hazards
created by the U.S. military outside of the country with the same degree of
seriousness that it has accorded defense sites within its territorial
borders.145 Although DoD operations within the fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and each of the fourteen U.S. territories and possessions1 46 are
subject to the strict regulation of federal environmental laws, 147 its
142 See infra Part IV.B.

The duty to avoid transboundary harm arises from

customary international law and is also found in international covenants such as the Rio
and Stockholm Declarations. Further, the ICJ has recognized the prohibition against
transboundary pollution in more than one case.
143See supra Part III.
144 See infra Part IV.C.
145See Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 424.
146 The fourteen U.S. territories and possessions are: American Samoa, Baker
Island, Guam, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnson Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway
Islands, Navassa Island, Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Palmyra Atoll, Puerto
Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wake Island. See Trade Information Center, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, at http://www.trade.gov/td/tic/tariff/us-territories.htm (last visited
Apr. 26, 2003).
147

U.S.

GEN. ACCT. OFF.,

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION:

CLEANUP

ACTIONS AT FORMERLY USED DEFENSE SITES 2, GAO-01-557 (2001) [hereinafter GAO01-557]. GAO-01-557 was prepared to assist the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce in assessing the properties potentially eligible for environmental clean-up
under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Id. at 3.
The existence of strict regulations for domestic bases does not mean that the
DoD actually adheres to them. In fact, the DoD is notorious for its reluctance to apply
federal regulations to bases within the United States and its territories. In 1992, the DoD
approached the Congressional Committee with a proposal requesting exemption from
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overseas installations
are not. 148
This double standard violates
149
law.
international
The right to non-discrimination is a basic human right, recognized
in the United Nations Charter 15 and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.1 5 1 The United States is a ratifying party to both of
these documents, as well as to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), all of which reverberate with the right to freedom from
discrimination. 152 The non-discrimination norm entitles everyone to
all the rights and freedoms set forth in [the UDHR],
without discrimination of any kind. . . . Furthermore, no
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other
limitation of sovereignty.153
The UDHR's description of non-discrimination is broad and therefore,
academics and practitioners have translated this human rights norm into
the international environmental arena.'54
federal environmental laws. See Harry H. Kelso, Preparingto Win in the Pentagon's
Environmental Clean- Up System and Recognizing Warning Signs on the Horizon, NAT'L
ASS'N OF ATT'YS GEN.: NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., No. 14-2, Mar. 1999, at 3.
148 Phelps, supra note 13, at 49.
149 See, e.g., Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 423-36 (arguing that U.S.
treatment of environmental risks at its bases in Panama violates the international law
principle of non-discrimination).
15 See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
151

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 9, 1966, 999

U.N.T.S. 171, arts. 2(1) and 26 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The United States ratified the
ICCPR in 1992. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ICCPR, Status
of Ratifications, at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited June 18, 2003).
152 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at 71, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. Some international
scholars consider the UDHR part of customary international law. See, e.g., Hurst
Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 319 (1995/1996).
151 UDHR art. 2.
154 Drafters of several international documents have utilized the human right to
freedom from discrimination in the environmental law context. See infra Part IV.A and
accompanying notes (describing the non-discrimination norm as found in the Stockholm
Declaration, the UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct, and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Principles).
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International environmental documents extend the nondiscrimination concept to decision-making that affects the global
ecosystem. For instance, the Stockholm Declaration links the three
elements of freedom, equality, and environmental quality as fundamental
freedoms and universal human rights.' 5 5 More specifically, Principle 13
of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Draft Principles
of Conduct states:
It is necessary for States, when considering, under their
domestic environmental policy, the permissibility of
domestic activities, to take into account the potential
adverse environmental affects arising out of the utilization
of shared natural resources, without discrimination as to
whether the effects would occur within theirjurisdiction or
outside it.156

See also Michael R. Anderson, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental
Protection. An

Overview, in HUMAN

RIGHTS APPROACHES

TO ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION 1-4 (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996). Anderson suggests
two ways to describe the relationship between human rights and the environment, in light

of the "fashionable view that human rights and environmental protection are
interdependent, complementary, and indivisible." !d. One, protecting the environment
can be viewed as one way to achieve the more general goal of upholding human rights
standards. Two, "the legal protection of human rights is an effective means to achieving
the ends of conservation and environmental protection." Id.
155 See Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 490 n.381 (citing Declaration
of
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc.

A/Conf. 48/14 (1972) (adopted by the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment at
Stockholm), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972), princ. 1 [hereinafter Stockholm
Declaration]). Principle 1 states the common conviction that:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and
adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits
a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solenm responsibility to
protect and improve the environment for present and future
generations.
In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating
apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial, and other forms
of oppression and foreign domination stand condemned and should be
eliminated.
156 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Draft Principles of
Conduct, In the Field of the Environment for Guidance of States in the Conservation and
Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, princ. 13,
U.N. Doc. UNEP/1G12/12 (1978), reprintedin 17 I.L.M. 1097, 1099 (1978) (emphasis
added).
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The norm of non-discrimination,
therefore, applies equally to decisions
57
environment.'
the
impacting
Under the non-discrimination principle, then, the United States
may not treat domestic efforts to repair and restore environmental
degradation differently from the efforts to do so abroad. International
observers note that had the bases been located in the United States, they
would not have qualified for turnover under the strict standards of RCRA
and CERCLA, 15 as U.S. environmental laws place strict restrictions on
property transferred from military to civilian hands.' 59 The U.S.
government's refusal to admit that it owes repair and restoration costs to
the Philippine government and the Pilipino people-in spite of official
recognition that its military activities did cause harm1 60 -implicates both
human rights law as well as narrower international environmental
concerns.
Several criticisms arise from the presentation of the nondiscrimination principle in this context. The non-discrimination norm is
"soft" law, merely hortatory, and thus, unenforceable. The application of
environmental laws abroad might have the unintended effect of
discouraging legislators from developing strict protections domestically.
Realistically, effective diplomacy requires the discretionary ability to
discriminate in appropriate situations. These three important concerns can
begin to be answered by remembering that the Republic of the Philippines,
157

Support for the environmental non-discrimination rule can be found in

various sources. See, e.g., Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World
Commission on Environment and Development, Legal Principles for Environmental
Protection and Sustainable Development, art. 1, U.N. Doc. WCED/86/23/Add.1 (1986)
("States shall, when considering under their domestic policy or law the permissibility of
an environmental interference or a significant risk thereof, take into account the
detrimental effects which are or may be caused by the environmental interference without
discrimination as to whether the effects would occur inside or outside the area under
their nationaljurisdiction") (emphasis added); Draft Principles on Human Rights and

Environment, Review of Further Developments in Fields With Which the SubCommission Has Been Concerned, Human Rights and the Environment: Final Report
Prepared by Mrs. Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR Commission
on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, 46th Sess., Annex I, princ. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (1994) ("All
persons shall be free from any form of discrimination in regard to actions and decisions
that affect the environment").
158

See Carlson, supra note 18, at 81. See also infra Part V.A.2 (discussing the

FACES lawsuit against the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy under the citizen suit provision
of CERCLA).
159 See infra Part V.
160 See GAO PHILIPPINES REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
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to this day, remains in the U.S. sphere of influence. 161 The United States,
by virtue of its continued control and jurisdiction over the Philippines,
cannot treat the Philippines as it would any other nation. 162 On a global
policy level, "arms-length" negotiation justifications
run counter to the
63
ideal of being a good international player.'
The unresponsive manner in which the United States has dealt with
its obligations in the Philippines seems especially irresponsible when
compared to the burdens it has voluntarily shouldered in developed
nations like Germany.1 64 Under the German Supplemental Agreement
(SA), the exacting rules of German environmental law will apply to all
United States military activity on its bases in Germany. 165 The German
SA "reflects the growing trend in host-nations of increased international
sensitivity to environmental issues."1' 66 The disparate treatment in which
161See Nicholas 0. Berry, The Conflict Between United States Intervention and
PromotingDemocracy in the Third World, 60 TEMP. L. Q. 1015 (1987) (submitting that
U.S. military intervention in countries like the Philippines, Korea, and the Dominican
Republic has left a legacy of dependence on U.S. markets, troops, loans, aid, and
investment).
162 The Philippines may arguably have a "special status" under international law
as a former colony of the United States. See John Heffner, Note, Between Assimilation
and Revolt: A Third Option for Hawaii as a Model for Minorities Worldwide, 37 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 591, 599 (2002) (citing Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1551 (D. Haw.
1997) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974))).
The United States
Supreme Court accorded a special political status to Native Americans in recognition of
the fact that "the United States overcame the Indians and took possession of their lands,
sometimes by force, leaving them uneducated, helpless and dependent people, needing
protection against the selfishness of others and their own improvidence." Morton, 417
U.S. at 552. Extending similar consideration to the Philippines could be justified under
the same reasoning.
163 See, e.g., Adam L. Aronson, Note, From "Cooperator's Loss" to
Cooperative Gain: Negotiating Greenhouse Gas Abatement, 102 YALE L.J. 2143, 214952 (1993); Jonathan Baert Weiner, Global EnvironmentalRegulation: Instrument Choice
in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 749-50 (1999) (critiquing the reluctance of States to
participate in international agreements as a "free rider" problem).
164 See Carlson, supra note 18, at 82 (comparing provisions of different
international agreements regarding overseas DoD installations).
165Agreement to Supplement the Agreement Between the Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces With Respect to Foreign Forces
Stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany (Mar. 18, 1993) art. 53, para. 1 [hereinafter
German SA].
166 Carlson, supra note 18, at 82. The German SA is still a relatively unique
arrangement in U.S. foreign policy. Other developed nations in which the United States
maintains military bases, such as Japan and South Korea, have not yet sought similar
protections. Id.
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the United States engages, differentiating between the Philippines and
Germany, violates the most basic understanding of the principle of non-

discrimination. 167
A guideline to applying the non-discrimination norm in an
environmental law context already exists. In order to implement the
environmental protections first enunciated in the Stockholm Declaration,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)of
which the
United
States of
is transboundary
a member 168-has
principles
on the
prevention
harm. formulated a series of
Countriesshould initially base their action on the principle
of non-discrimination,whereby[:]
polluters causing transfrontier pollution should be subject
to legal or statutory provisions no less severe than those
which would apply for any equivalent pollution occurring
within their country, under comparable conditions and in
comparable zones.'69
The OECD recommendation specifically addresses the disparate treatment
of countries in regards to environmental risks, acknowledging the
existence of an international expectation that certain principles of equality
and non-discrimination will be utilized in policy making. 170
Here, the polluter is the U.S. military. Had the U.S. government
applied the principle of non-discrimination to its operations at Clark,
Subic, and the other military installations it controlled in the Philippines, it
would not have abandoned the bases without regard to the environmental
hazards posed by its activities there. 17 1 Had the U.S. government applied
the principle of non-discrimination to its military activities in the
167

See infra Part VI for a discussion surrounding the United States' duties to

protect for the environment of Germany under the Supplementary Agreement. See also
supra note 116.
168
Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 491. See also OECD Member
Countries List, available at http://www.oecd.org/EN/countrylist/0,,EN-countrylist-0nondirectorate-no-no- 159-0,00.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2003).
169 Guidelines Governing Transfrontier Pollution and Transboundary Issues,
O.E.C.D. Doc. C(74) 224 (Annex), adopted Nov. 14, 1974, available at
http://www.elr.info/International/ielpre92/CHAP09.pdf (last visited June 7, 2003)
[hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
170 Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 491.
171 See David Armstrong, A Toxic Legacy Abroad: The Military Has Polluted in
Ways that Would be Illegal in the United States, BOSTON

GLOBE,
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Philippines, it would not have been able to relinquish its former defense
sites without first repairing and restoring them to a condition suitable for
civilian use. 172 Instead, the United States ignored the fact that its military
operations created a state of environmental disaster in the communities
surrounding 173
its former military bases by refusing to clean up its mess
left.
it
before
B.
Duty and
TransboundaryHarm

Breach:

The

United

States

Caused

The prohibition against transboundary harm is one of the most
elementary principles of international environmental law. 174 Principle 21
of the Stockholm Declaration inscribed into written international law the
customary expectation that States will "ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction and control [do] not cause damage to the environment of other
states." 175 The aspirations of Principle 21 have become further engraved
in international law by the texts of subsequent treaties and declarations.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration)
and the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context require that all States conserve, protect, and
restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystems to prevent,
reduce, and control significant adverse transboundary environmental
impacts. 176 The Rio Declaration further requires States to ensure that

172 See Carlson, supra note 18.
173 See GAO PHILIPPINES REPORT, supra note 3.

174 See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46
DuKE L.J. 931, 938 (1997) (describing the prohibition against transboundary pollution as
having "a fairly high degree of consensus under both international customary law and

U.S. statutory law").
175 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 155, at princ. 21 (emphasis added).
176 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 874 (1992), princ. 7 (providing in relevant part: "States shall cooperate in a spirit
of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the
Earth's ecosystem")[hereinafter Rio Declaration]; Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Sept. 3, 1991, UNECE, reprintedin 30 I.L.M.
800 (1991), art. 2(1)

[hereinafter Espoo Convention].

Article 2(1) of the Espoo

Convention provides: "The Parties shall, either individually or jointly, take all
appropriate and effective measures to prevent, reduce, and control significant adverse
transboundary environmental impact from proposed activities." Id.
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activities within their jurisdictions or control do not cause damage to the
environment 7of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
17
jurisdiction.
The United States is bound by this principle because the obligation
not to cause transboundary harm is generally accepted and followed by the
178
international community, making it customary international law.
Furthermore, the United States has long availed itself of the sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas179 principle. 18 In 1941, the United States claimed
that Canada should accept State responsibility for the air pollution caused

The Rio Declaration is a non-binding document, but David Hunter and his coauthors submit that it contains many emerging international environmental law
principles.
By confirming that a consensus exists among States on the importance
of these principles, the Rio Declarationmay significantly further the

development of international environmental law, as well as the
possibility of incorporating specific principles in subsequent treaties,
and even the possibility of formal codification of an international
binding covenant on environment and development in the future.
DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 307 (1998).
Aspirational international documents such as the Stockholm and Rio
Declarations have a heightened status in the liability context because international
tribunals like the ICJ base their decisions on international custom and general principles
of international law. Statute of the International Court of Justice, T.S. No. 993, 59 Stat.
1055, art. 38 (1)(b) and (c)(respectively) (June 26, 1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. See
also David A. Wirth, The Rio Declarationon Environment and Development. Two Steps
Forwardand One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 602-03 (1995) (suggesting
that although the Stockholm and Rio Declarations are not "technically binding," they are
"influential in establishing 'good practice standards,' which may later be codified in
binding treaties or may mature into binding customary obligations").
17 Rio Declaration, supra note 176, princ. 2.
178 A customary norm binds all States if it comes from the general and
consistent practice of States and is followed by States out of a sense of legal obligation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987) (defining customary international law) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. See also ICJ
Statute, supra note 176, at art. 38(1)(b) (requiring the ICJ "to apply international custom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law").
179 Latin for: "So use your own as not to injure another's property." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1690 (7th ed. 1999).
"h0 This principle is also used in U.S. property and torts law. See Bove v.
Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 231 (1932) (explaining that a claim for
private nuisance arises when an owner uses her property to "the material annoyance of
[her] neighbor, if the latter's enjoyment of life or property is materially lessened
thereby"). "The old and familiar maxim that one must so use his property as not to injure
that of another (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas) is deeply imbedded in our law." Id.
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by a private smelter company. 18 1 An ore smelter located in Trail, British
Columbia was emitting sulfur dioxide gas and these fumes were causing
damage to crops, farm animals, and other private property across the
border in Washington state.'82 The arbitral tribunal found for the United
States and awarded damages.' 83 Although the Trail Smelter ruling was
defined in the context of a narrowly prescribed arbitration proceeding, it is
widely cited for the customary international law proposition that "no state
may allow its territory to be used in 84a way that causes environmental
injury to the territory of another state."'
In 1949, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) echoed the
reasoning of the Trail Smelter tribunal, ruling that every State has the
obligation not to allow its territory to be used for activities that infringe on
the rights of other States.'85 More recently, in the 1996 Advisory Opinion
on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory
Opinion on Nuclear Weapons), the ICJ specifically recognized that the
general prohibition against transboundary harm extends to environmental
issues. 186 The ICJ restated the obligation of States not to cause harm to
others by noting that
the environment is not an abstraction but represents the
living space, the quality of life and the very health of
human beings, including generations unborn.
The
existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the
environment of other States or of areas beyond national
control is now part of the corpus of international law
relating to the environment.187

181 Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (Apr. 16,

1938 &Mar. 11, 1941).
182

Id.

183

Id.

184 See Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 440 (citing to Trail Smelter Case
(U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911 (1941)).
185 See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22-23 (Apr. 9).
186

Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,

1996 I.C.J. 226.
187Id. at 241-42 (emphasis added).
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Under this principle, States are responsible for internal polluting activities
that cause injury in neighboring States.'88 The ICJ's Advisory Opinion on
Nuclear Weapons indicates that the United States can be held responsible
under international environmental law for the effects of pollution
originating on its former bases in the Philippines.
In assessing the political will of a State to implement measures
required under treaties and other multilateral regimes, the international
community has imposed a standard of "due diligence." This norm is the
measure by which international tribunals judge whether States have used
the "best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their
capabilities" '1 89 to bring about the necessary changes in government to
ensure that the aims of those international agreements are fulfilled. In the
environmental context, the due diligence standard requires the United
States to take all reasonable measures to ensure that its activities do not
create substantial transboundary harm. 190 The United States has failed to
act with due diligence because although it knew that its Philippine-based
military activities caused harm to the environment, it did not prevent the
harm, nor did it act later to rectify the harm.1 9 1 The United States had a
burden under international law to ensure that the activities within its
military bases did not produce any degradation of the environment in the
Philippines. Failure on the part of the United States to observe this duty
comes with a concomitant obligation to provide a remedy.
C.

Assigning Liability Under the PolluterPays Principle

The Polluter Pays Principle supports the simple argument that
because the United States is the party responsible for creating
188 James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary
Principlein InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 14 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 423, 427 (1995).
189 See Lisa M. Kaplan, Comment, InternationalResponsibility of an Occupying
Powerfor Environmental Harm: The Case of Estonia, 12 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 153, 199
(1999) (citing UNCLOS, art. 194(2)). See also Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, Judgment of
July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 294 (1989)
(applying the due diligence standard in a human rights context).
190 See Kaplan, supra note 189, at 159 n.38 (citing to Riccardo PisilloMazzeschi, Forms of International Responsibility for Environmental Harm, in
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM (Francesco Francioni &
Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1991), reprinted in EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 511 (1998)). Kaplan argues that the former Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics violated the duty not to cause transboundary harm to
occupied Estonia, as measured by the due diligence standard. Id.
191 See supra Part III.
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environmental hazards in and around the military bases at Subic and
Clark, it has the obligation to compensate the Philippine government and
the individuals directly injured. 192 In 1992, members of the world
community declared their support of the Polluter Pays Principle. The Rio
Declaration, in Principle 16, states:
National authorities should endeavor to promote the
internalization of environmental costs and the use of
economic instruments, taking into account the approach
that the polluter
should, in principle, bear the cost of
193
pollution.
The continued operation of the annual Balikatan exercises violates
international law because it places the Pilipino people at grave1 94risk of
environmental disaster without providing adequate legal remedies.'
Various international and regional organizations are in the process
195
liability regimes based on the Polluter Pays Principle.
developing
of
Many nations, including the Philippines and the United States, already
have domestic legislation that embraces that basic principle. 196 The
European Community (EC)'s White Paper, however, is one of the most
outstanding achievements in developing an organized liability regime
Cf Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 477.
193Rio Declaration, supra note 176, at princ. 16 (emphasis added).
194 See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Legal Regime Governing Sea Transport of
192

Ultrahazardous Radioactive Materials, 33 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 77, 77 (2002)
(contending that although international treaties have established a liability regime for
nuclear shipping accidents, lacunae still exist, placing coastal nations at "grave risk of
environmental harm without any legal protections"). Professor Van Dyke predicts that,
as a result of this situation, coastal nations will resort to unilateral actions to protect their
coastal marine resources. Id. at 92.
195 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 176, at 384. It is mainly industrialized
nations that have adopted or advocated the use of the Polluter Pays Principle. "Except for
Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, developing countries have for the
most part not accepted the polluter and user pays principle." Id. (citing OECD Council
Recommendation on Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of
Environmental Policies, May 26, 1972, C(72)128 (1972);
OECD Council
Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, Nov. 14, 1974,
C(74)223 (1974); European Charter on the Environment and Health, Principles for Public
Policy, art. 11, Dec. 8, 1989, WHO Doc. ICP/RUD 113/Conf. Doc./1, reprinted in 20
ENVTL. POL. & LAW 57 (1990); Convention on Transboundary Lakes and Watercourses,
art. 2(5)(b); EEC Treaty, as amended by Single European Act, Title VII, art. 130r, 2,
Feb. 17, 1982; Agenda 21, 2.14, 30.3 (1992)).
196 See infra Parts IV-V and accompanying notes.
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under international environmental law. 197 The White Paper is a detailed
and comprehensive proposal for an EC directive on civil liability
regarding injuries to the environment, applying the Polluter Pays
Principle. 198 As such, it provides one basis upon which the United States'
liability can be measured. 199
Noting that not all forms of environmental damage can be
remedied through liability regimes, 200 the EC's Directorate-General for the
Environment concluded that three elements are required for a liability
scheme to be effective. These three conditions are: (1) one or more
identifiable polluters; (2) concrete and quantifiable damage; and (3) a
causal link between the damage and the identified polluters. 2001 Each of
these three prerequisites are satisfied in the case concerning the United
States' former military bases in the Philippines. First, the United States,
197

White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM (00)66 final [hereinafter

White Paper]. A directive to shape an EC-wide environmental liability regime was
commissioned in 1994, by resolution of the European Parliament. Work on the White
Paper began in 1997 and included consultation with EC Member States before the final
report was published in 2000. Id. at 7, 11-12.
198 Id. at 11.
199 Raymond F. DuBois, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Installations
and Environment (DUSD (I&E)), is charged with fostering cooperation between the U.S.
and foreign militaries, and encouraging the value of environmental stewardship on U.S.
military
installations
worldwide.
See
DUSD
(I&E)
Biography,
at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/ie bio.htm (last visited June 5, 2003).
The Defense
Environmental Network and Information Exchange (DENIX) contains a hyperlink to the
White Paper in a list of documents relating to the DoD's international environmental
policy. These materials fall under the purview of the DUSD(I&E). See DENIX, Subject
Areas, International,
Documents, at http://www.denix.osd.mill/denix/Public/Intl/
international.html (last visited June 5, 2003).
See About DENIX, DENIX Homepage, at https://www.denix.osd.mil/ (last
visited June 6, 2003).
DENIX serves as a central platform for the dissemination of
environment, safety, and occupational health (ESOH) news, policy, and
guidance within Department of Defense (DoD) activities worldwide, in
support of the national defense mission. DENIX informs ESOH
professionals of salient issues and provides them with tools to sustain
their readiness and compliance efforts with Congressional and DoD
requirements.

Id.
See White Paper, supra note 197, at 13.
Assigning liability for
environmental degradation may be difficult in some scenarios. For example, it may be
impossible to create a direct link between the negative effects of acid rain and the
greenhouse effect to individual actors. Id.
201 Id.
200
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operating through its DoD, is the polluter. Second, although the full
extent of damages was never completely ascertained, it was estimated that
20 2
cleanup would cost approximately $12-15 million for each affected site.
Third, GAO reports document that the U.S. military caused the discharge
of untreated chemical and heavy metal wastes into the air, ground, and
water in and around Clark Air Force and Subic Bay Navy bases. 20 3 The
EC's formulation of the Polluter Pays Principle, then, can provide an
effective means of assessing the United States' liability for creating
environmental dangers in the Philippines.
The White Paper does not provide the definitive method of
assessing liability, but because the United States accepts the rationale
behind the Polluter Pays Principle, it should submit to implementation of
it under the terms detailed by the EC. The Polluter Pays Principle is

recognized in U.S. environmental laws. The

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

records the view

that:
Where pollution originating in a state has caused significant
injury to person outside that state, or has created a
significant risk of such injury, the state of origin is
obligated to accord to the person injured or exposed to such
risk access to the same judicial or administrative remedies
available in similar circumstances to persons within the
state.2 °4
The American Law Institute's coverage of the Polluter Pays Principle is
interesting because it simultaneously invokes the principle of nondiscrimination. Actually, United States law incorporates many of the
principal elements of international environmental law discussed above.
Foremost under the U.S. system is the requirement to remedy any harm
done to the environment. The remediation provisions in CERCLA mirror
20 5
the basic tenets of the Polluter Pays Principle under international law.
The United States also has a well-developed liability regime for

202 GAO PHILIPPNES REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
203

Id. at 27-28.

204 RESTATEMENT, supra note 178, at §602(2).
205 See supra Part IV.C; infra Part V.A.2.
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environmental damages. In some respects, the U.S. scheme may
be even
2 6
more established and structured than the European Community's.
V.

U.S. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND THE
EXTRATERRITORIALITY PROBLEM

The federal government of the United States has an established,
comprehensive environmental law regime. The United States can be
credited as being one of the first nations in the world to have created a
legal regime designed to protect its environmental resources for future
° A study of the applicable federal laws is appropriate here
generations. 207

because they directly pertain to the actions of all federal agencies,
including the military. Moreover, these regulations should remain in force

regardless of the location of the military activity.

In 1990, Congress

demanded that the DoD develop and implement an overseas cleanup

policy that would reconcile aberrant overseas practices with the
requirements of domestic law. 208 The reason for this command was that
although domestic military bases are obligated to conform to federal
environmental laws, overseas installations are not. 209 The laws governing
base closures in the United States therefore provide a valuable reference
point for assessing U.S. obligations in the Philippines. 2 1 A survey of the
laws applicable to DoD military installations overseas shows that the U.S.

was obligated in 1992 and obligated today to clean up the environmental
damages it caused on and in the vicinity of its former bases in the
Philippines.
206

See Hila J. Alderman, Comment, The Ghost of ProgressPast:A Comparison

of Approaches to Hazardous Waste Liability in the European Community and the United
States, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 311, 320-24 (1993) (comparing CERCLA and the EC's
Proposed Civil Liability Directive). "European nations are looking to the experiences of
the United States with regard to CERCLA in formulating similar legislation concerning
liability for hazardous wastes." Id. at 313.
207 See generally George H. Keller, Casenote, Greenpeace USA v. Stone: The
Comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement and the Extraterritorial Reach of
NEPA, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 751, 762-764 (1992) (examining the legislative history of
NEPA). Congress enacted NEPA in 1969 in response to concerns that the poor condition
of the environment would only worsen without federal legislative action. NEPA became
the charter document thereafter guiding the United States federal government's
environmental policymaking. Id.
201 Phelps, supra note 13, at 55-56.
209 Carlson, supra note 18, at 70.
210 See Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 426 (using U.S. base closure
procedures as a tool for comparison in their argument regarding the closures of U.S.
military bases in Panama).
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A.

The ExtraterritorialityProblem

Domestic environmental laws are one element in the U.S.
government's overseas environmental law formula. Applying domestic
legislation
abroad, however, poses the special problem of
extraterritoriality. Congressional legislation is presumed to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Untied States, unless, "language in
the relevant act gives any indication of a congressional purpose to extend
its coverage beyond places over which the United States has sovereignty
or has some measure of legislative control., 2' 1 The presumption against
extraterritoriality is known as the Foley doctrine. 2 12 Congress does have
the authority to regulate conduct outside the territory of the United States,
and the determination of whether Congress has actually utilized this
authority is a matter of statutory construction.2 13
The main hurdle in seeking to apply the environmental regulations
established by Congress to the U.S. bases in the Philippines is determining
211 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing Foley Bros.

v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)) [hereinafter ARAMCO].
212 See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). The federal legislation
at issue in Foley provided that overtime compensation was due for any work in excess of
an eight-hour workday. Id. at 282 (citing to Eight-Hour Law, 27 Stat. 340 (1892)
(formerly codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-326). The plaintiffs claimed
overtime pay for work performed in Iraq and Iran. Id. at 283. The United States
Supreme Court ruled that the federal law did not apply extraterritorially to the plaintiffs.
Id. at 285. The Court reasoned that federal legislation applies only within the territory of
the United States unless there is a clear Congressional intent that the law is to apply
extraterritorially. Id.
213
See Jonathan Turley, Legal Theory: "When in Rome": Multinational
Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,84 NW. U. L. REV. 598,
604-608 (1990) (discussing the exclusion of U.S. anti-trust laws from the general
presumption against extraterritorial application). See also ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248
(explaining that the presumption against extraterritorial application is simply a rule of
statutory construction).
Congress has enacted federal criminal laws that are intended to apply only when
a U.S. citizen travels abroad. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XXXII, § 320935(e), 108 Stat. 2137, reproducedat
156 F.R.D. 497, 503 [hereinafter Violent Crime Act of 1994]. The Violent Crime Act of
1994 makes it illegal to travel with the intent to engage in a sexual act with a juvenile.
Id. Criminal legislation like the 1994 Act reflects the principle of nationality jurisdiction,
or the idea that a State has the competence under international law to promulgate laws
regulating the conduct of its nationals wherever they may be located. See Jordan J. Paust,
Federal Jurisdiction Over ExtraterritorialActs of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for
Violators of InternationalLaw Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, in JORDAN
J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 403 (2000).
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whether domestic laws can be enforced outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States. The traditional policy against applying domestic
laws overseas is motivated by a desire not to infringe on the sovereignty of
the nation hosting the U.S. activity. 214 This rationale is mitigated when, as
with the Philippines, the host country's laws are substantially similar to
U.S. laws and when the host country does not object to the application of
215
U.S. laws in place of their own laws.
Moreover, the international law
principle of non-discrimination encourages the application of the strictest
regulation of activities that can cause environmental harm, in recognition
of the potentially irreparable destruction that can occur.216
1.

NEPA

2 17

The National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) is important
to the discussion regarding U.S. military bases in the Philippines because
the purpose of this statute is to ensure that the federal government and its
agencies consider the environmental consequences that follow government
actions. As one court noted, NEPA "was designed explicitly to take
account of impending as well as present cases in this country and in the
world as a whole." 218 Under NEPA, all "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" require the
preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) before the major
federal action commences.219
214 See Carlson, supra note 18, at 79. See also infra Part V.A.1 (discussing the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia's rationale in NEPA Coalition of
Japanv. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993)).
215 See Bayoneto, supra note 13, at 138 (citing to Teresa Albor, As U.S. Vacates
PhilippinesBases, Toxic Wastes Remain, SAN DIEGO UNiON-TRIB., Nov. 29, 1992, at A46).
216 See supra Part IV.A.
217 See National Environmental Policy Act, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,
4332(2)(C) [hereinafter NEPA]. NEPA requires that federal agencies prepare detailed
statements on the environmental impact of all "major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment." NEPA provides strict requirements for
the environmental impact statements (EISs) as well as the procedures for preparing them.
See id.
218 Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 425 (citing to City of Los Angeles v.
NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) (emphasis added).
219 NEPA, supra note 217, 42 U.S.C. at § 4332(c). This section of NEPA
describes in detail what elements should be included in an environmental impact
statement (EIS):
[A]]] Agencies of the Federal Government . . . shall include in ever
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
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Federal NEPA has been the subject of extensive litigation
regarding its extraterritorial application. The language of the statute itself

indicates the intent of legislators to bring any major federal action that
poses a threat to the world environment within its purview. The statute

uses broad language to describe its policy and objectives.

In one section,

it specifically mandates federal agencies to "recognize the worldwide and
long-range character of environmental problems. 2 2 °
Arguably, Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)v. Massey,22 1 raises
the possibility that NEPA does not raise any extraterritorial issues. In
Massey, the EDF sought to enjoin the National Science Foundation (NSF)
from incinerating food wastes at the U.S. research facility at McMurdo
Station in Antarctica. 222 EDF argued that burning the garbage would
produce a significant effect on the environment, and therefore that the
NSF had violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS before using the
incinerator. 223 The Massey court held that NEPA applied to the NSF's
actions in Antarctica. The court gave two reasons for its holding. First,
Antarctica had a unique status-it had no sovereign and it was the subject
224
of substantial United States control.
Second, and more important,
NEPA applied to the NSF's burning of food wastes because the decisionmaking process occurred primarily within United States borders. 225 The
latter rationale is known as the "headquarters theory." 226 The court found
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on
(i)
the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii)
any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii)
alternatives to the proposed action
(iv)
the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity, and
(v)
any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.
220 Id. at § 4332(F).
221 Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
222 Id. at 529.
223

Id. at 530.

224

Id. at 533-34.

225

Id. at 531.

226 See Laura Carlan Battle, A TransnationalPerspective on Expanding NEPA:
The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 5
DuKE ENVTL. L. &POL'Y F. 1, 13 (1995).

HeinOnline -- 4 APLPJ 365 2003

366

ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL, Vol. 4, Issue 2 (Summer 2003)

that NEPA was designed to regulate the decision-making processes
occurring in the United States, where federal agencies make their
decisions. Under Massey, an analysis of the applicability of NEPA should
not focus on where the impacts of the decision occur, but on where the
deliberation takes place.2 27
Later that same year, the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia held that NEPA did not apply to U.S. Navy installations in
Japan. In NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 228 the plaintiffs argued that
229
the DoD was required to prepare EISs for its military bases in Japan.
Deviating from the Massey precedent, the court distinguished Japan from
Antarctica, emphasizing the intrusive nature of applying NEPA in Japan
and the potential negative impacts on U.S. foreign policy. 230 The Aspin
court held that if the DoD was required to prepare EISs, the court would
be encroaching on political territory that is reserved to the executive
branch.2 3 1
Initially, Aspin might appear to be the most relevant precedent
when seeking to apply federal NEPA to U.S. military activities in the
Philippines. The arguments espoused by the Aspin court against the
extraterritorial application of NEPA, however, do not confront the special
historical relationship between the United States and the Philippines. The
primary concern of the Aspin court was that "[b]y requiring the DoD to
prepare EISs, the Court would risk intruding upon a long standing treaty
relationship," thereby infringing on Japanese sovereignty. 232 Under
Massey, however, NEPA requirements cannot infringe on the sovereignty
of the Philippines if the federal action in question -sending U.S. troops to
engage in war games-exclusively affects U.S. operations.
The same is
227 Massey, 986 F.2d at 531-535.
228 NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993).

Id. at 467.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 468. The Court reasoned: "Plausible assertions have been made that
229

EIS preparation would impact upon the foreign policy of the United States." Id.
232 Aspin, 837 F. Supp. at 467. In the footnote to that sentence, the Court states:
The preparation of EISs would necessarily require the DoD to collect

environmental data from the surrounding residential and industrial
complexes, thereby intruding on Japanese sovereignty. In addition the
DoD would have to [assess] the impact of Japanese military activities
at these bases. There is no evidence that Congress intended NEPA to
encompass the activities of a foreign sovereign within its own territory.
Id. at n.5.
233 See Carlson, supra note 18, at 91.
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true even when the operations are located abroad.23 4 Since the concerns
over State sovereignty and separation of powers are not present in the
issue surrounding U.S. liability for environmental harms to the
Philippines, Massey remains the controlling authority. The Massey court
cited to several situations in which the presumption against
extraterritoriality is weak. The presumption is weak in cases where the
United States exerts substantial control over the region at issue.235
The United States does exercise significant legislative and political
control over military bases in the Philippines and their environs. For
instance, the 1998 VFA subjects the military bases to U.S. domestic
law. 236 An outstanding example of U.S. influence and control came in
2000, when the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs waived its
exclusive and primary jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel accused of
crimes under Philippine law. 237 After a night of bar-hopping in Cebu City
on March 12, 2000, three U.S. Navy personnel 238 allegedly pummeled taxi
driver Marcelo Batestil over a dispute involving PP900 (US$18) cab
fare. 239 The Batestil beating was seen by many as the first test of U.S.
compliance with the 1998 VFA. During the height of publicity
surrounding the Batestil case, Philippine Senator Loren Legarda
commented that the Philippines would be considered "the laughing stock
of the international community" if it waived jurisdiction, as requested by
the United States. 240 This incident is a stark example of the real control

234

Id.

235 Massey, 986 F.2d at 531-35 (citing ARAMCO, 111 S.Ct. at 1230; Sierra
Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978); People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F.
Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973)). The Enewetak court concluded:
By its own terms, NEPA is not restricted to United States
territory delimited by the fifty states.... NEPA is framed in expansive

language that clearly evidences a concern for all persons subject to
federal action which has a major impact on their environment

not

merely United States citizens located in the fifty states.
Enewetak, 353 F. Supp. at 816.
236 See supra Part II.A.
237 Aurea Calica, Gov't Waives Jurisdiction Over 3 U.S. Sailors, PHILIPPINE
STAR, Apr. 1, 2000, http://www.philstar.com/philstar/print.asp?article=4110 (last visited
Mar. 27, 2003).
231 Perseus Echeminada, Cebu Driver Vows Not to Settle
with U.S. Sailors,
PHILIPPINE STAR, Feb. 22, 2000, http://www.philstar.com/philstar/print.asp?article=3906
(last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
239 Calica, supra note 237.
240 Echeminada, supra note 238.
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that the United States continues to hold and assert when it deems
appropriate. 241
Under these circumstances, then, the application of NEPA to U.S.
military installations in the Philippines, permanent or temporary, is not
extraterritorial. Enforcing U.S. environmental law requirements abroad
constitutes the straightforward application of U.S. laws on facilities,
activities, and operations that are under substantial U.S. control. Further,
application of NEPA's regulations on the DoD's activities abroad does not
violate the strict rule regarding extraterritoriality announced in Aspin. The
executive branch, through executive orders, has already committed to

Examples of the continuing U.S. control over Philippine affairs abound.
Former Philippine President Joseph Estrada signed the Rome Statute, a multilateral treaty
that creates the International Criminal Court (ICC), in December 2000. R.J. Villanueva,
Rights Advocates Press R.P. 's ICC Membership, ABS-CBN NEWS.COM, Mar. 28, 2003,
at
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/abs news body.asp?section=Provincial&oid= 19313
(last visited Mar. 28, 2003). However, the Philippines was not able to nominate a
national representative to the judicial panel of the ICC because the administrative
officials have not yet transmitted the statute to Congress. Larry Roque, Professor of
International Law at the University of the Philippines, alleged that the Philippine officials
are withholding the release of the Rome Statute because "they want to prove their loyalty
to the U.S." Id.
In order to protect its military personnel from the jurisdiction of the ICC, the
United States has begun to negotiate bilateral treaties with other states with provisions
that will contain the contracting state's pledge not to extradite U.S. military officials.
The Philippines has not yet signed such an agreement.
Human Rights Watch,
International Criminal Court: U.S. Efforts to Negotiate Bilateral Immunity Agreements,
Apr. 2, 2003, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
241

otherissuesimpunityagreem.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2003). At least thirteen other
States have signed such treaties, including Romania, Israel, East Timor, Tajikistan,

Micronesia, and Gambia. DAVID WEISSBRODT, ET AL., Supplement to Chapter 8: Can
Human Rights Violators Be Held Accountable?, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW,
POLICY AND PROCESS (3d ed. 2001), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/ humanrts/intlhr/

(last visited June 9, 2003). The European Union, however, has been critical of the
exemption attempts by the United States. See Resolution 1300, Parliamentary Assembly
of
the
Council
of
Europe,
Sept.
25,
2002,
available
at
http://www.iccnow.org/html/coe2002O925english.pdf
(last visited June 9, 2003)
(declaring that the U.S. bilateral attempts at exemption are invalid under the Vienna
Convention on Law of the Treaties).
In 2002, President Bush signed the American Servicemembers Protection Act
into law. See American Servicemembers Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§7401-7433 (2002).
Since its promulgation, the United States has warned other States that they will lose U.S.
military aid if they do not sign an exemption agreement. See WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra,
at 5 (citing Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers' Immunity,
N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25400439).
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242
broad environmental protections for federal agency actions overseas.
Moreover, the sovereignty of the Philippines would not be threatened
243
since Philippine environmental laws are modeled after U.S. laws.

2.

CERCLA

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA, or Superfund 2 44) authorizes the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to investigate and clean sites contaminated with
hazardous substances. 245 Parties found responsible for contamination can
be held jointly and severally liable to the government for cleanup costs
and damages to natural resources. 246 The DoD has recognized that
CERCLA applies to its military installations, and works cooperatively
with the EPA to ensure that the federal regulations are followed.247
For example, when a military base is scheduled for closure, federal
law requires that an EIS be performed.248 In order to comply with this
242 In spite of the ruling in Aspin, NEPA can still be applied to U.S. overseas
military bases. Aspin did not address federal agency requirements under the Federal

Facility Compliance Act of 1992 (FFCA). See Bayoneto, supra note 13, at 147 (citing to
FFCA, 42 U.S.C. §6901, et seq.). The FFCA was enacted specifically to address the
gross violations of U.S. environmental laws by federal agencies, most notably, the DoD
and the Department of Energy. Id. Prior to 1992, when the FFCA was passed, U.S.
military bases were allowed to ignore federal environmental regulations. See Schettler,
Reverberations of Militarism, supra note 16. In 1992, Congress enacted the FFCA and
explicitly stated its intent to make the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(regarding pollution control) applicable to "all actions of the federal government, past
and present, which are subject to solid or hazardous waste laws." Bayoneto, supra note
13, at 135 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 111, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 5, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1287, 1291).
243 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
244 The remediation and liability provisions under CERCLA are more
commonly collectively known as the "Superfund" program. For an overview of
Superfund,
see U.S.
Envtl.
Protection
Agency, About Superfund, at
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm (last visited June 10, 2003).
245 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 1-531, 100 Stat. 1613-1782 (1986) [hereinafter
CERCLA].
246 CERCLA, § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
247
See Jessica K. Reynolds, Military Base Closure Oversight Via
Environmental Regulations: Replacing Judicial Review of Closure Decisions and
Methods with Comprehensive Alternative Redevelopment Mechanisms, 4 ALB. L. ENVTL.
OUTLOOK 40, 45, 47 (1999).
248

10 U.S.C. § 2687(b)(1) (2003).
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regulation, the DoD performs an Environmental Baseline Survey (EBS) on
bases subject to closure. 249 In theory, the EBS is
based on all existing environmental information related to
storage, release, treatment or disposal of hazardous
substances or petroleum products on the property to
determine or discover the obviousness of the presence
or
2 50
likely presence of a release or threatened release.
The investigation and clean-up provisions of CERCLA are triggered when
the EBS indicates a release of hazardous contamination or a threat of such
release. 2 51 Under CERCLA, after an initial warning of release or threat of
release is identified by the EBS, the DoD is required to work under the
supervision of the EPA to conduct another assessment of the base to
determine whether its environmental situation poses a substantial risk to
human health or the environment. 2 52 This process ensures that when
formerly used defense sites are passed from military to civilian hands, "all
remedial action necessary to protect human health and the environment
with respect 25to3 any [hazardous] substance remaining on the property has
been taken.,
EBS requirements are applied only to military bases within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, including U.S. territories and
possessions, but excluding former colonies, like the Philippines. As
discussed, application of one set of strict environmental standards for
domestic bases and another set for overseas bases is a violation of
international law.25 4 Abhorrence for this type of double standard should
also guide U.S. jurisprudence, especially in light of the extensive control
that the United States maintains in the Philippines. Utilizing the same
analysis used by the Massey court in NEPA litigation, 255 the Superfund

249
POLICY

Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 427 (citing U.S.

ON THE IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE COMMUNITY

FACILITATION ACT 1-3 (1993)).
250
Id. (citing to Secretary

DEP'T OF DEFENSE,

ENVIRONMENTAL

RESPONSE

of Defense William Perry, Memorandum for

Secretaries of the Military Departments, DoD Policy on the Environmental Review
Process to Reach a Finding of Suitability to Lease, at 2 (Sept. 9, 1993)).
251 Id. at 428.
252 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 300.420(b)(1)(i) (1997)).
253 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii)().
254 See supra Part IV.A.
255 See supra Part V.A. 1.

HeinOnline -- 4 APLPJ 370 2003

A Plan For the Future

provisions of CERCLA are equally accessible to extraterritorial
application.
A case currently before the District Court for the Northern District
of California will test whether CERCLA can be applied to U.S. activities
outside the territorial borders of the United States. On December 3, 2002,
Arc Ecology and the Filipino American Coalition for Environmental
Solutions (FACES) filed a case against the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy
on behalf of thirty-six residents of communities near the former U.S.
military bases at Clark Air Field and Subic Naval Base.256 The plaintiffs
seek an assessment of environmental damage at the former bases. 257 The
main legal issue in this case will be whether CERCLA's
provisions apply
258
to U.S. facilities outside U.S. territorial borders.
CERCLA applies to the release of hazardous contaminants on the
former U.S. military bases in the Philippines. Section 105(d) of CERCLA
provides:
Any person who is, or may be, affected by a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant, may petition the President to conduct a
preliminary assessment of the hazards to public health and
the environment which are associated by such release or
threatened release.259
Under the clear terms of the statute, "environment" is defined as "any...
water, ground water, drinking water supply, land surface subsurface strata,
or ambient air within the United States or under the jurisdiction of the
United States." 260 The 1947 MBA provided the United States with

256 Plaintiffs Complaint, ARC Ecology v. United States Dep't. of the Air Force
(N.D.

Cal.

filed

Dec.

3,

2002)

(on

file

with

author),

available at

http://yonip.com/YONIP/PTFBC/lawsuit filed.html [hereinafter NGO lawsuit]. The suit
was filed under the citizen suit provision of CERCLA. Id. at para. 1. See also Leilani M.
Gallardo, U.S. Military Sued for Toxic Pollution at Subic, Clark, BUslNESSWORLD
(Manila), Dec. 5, 2002, at P12, 2002 WL 103398346 (reporting on the NGO-led lawsuit

against the U.S. military).
257 Gallardo, supra note 256, at P12.
258

Chandler E. Ramas III, Air Force, Navy Sued Over Toxic Wastes, PHIL.

NEWS ONLrNE ED., Dec. 2, 2002, at http://www.philippinenews.com/issues/dec02/dec4-

10/headlines.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
259 CERCLA, supra note 246, 42 U.S.C. 9605(d) (emphasis added).
260 Id. at 9601(8)(B).

HeinOnline -- 4 APLPJ 371 2003

372

ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW& POLICY JOURNAL, Vol. 4, Issue 2 (Summer 2003)

jurisdiction and control of its military bases on sixteen different sites in the
Philippines. 261
The fact that CERCLA was promulgated in 1994, after the last of
the permanently stationed U.S. troops left Clark and Subic, does not bar
application of CERCLA's requirements. The DoD's obligation to clean
up hazardous conditions on military bases is not extinguished even when
they are transferred to civilian use.
Formerly used defense sites
transferred to civilian use come with a warranty binding the United States
to perform any necessary additional remedial action after the date of
transfer. 262 Furthermore, even if CERCLA does not apply here, the United
States is bound by international law to compensate for the releases
of
263
hazardous substances on its former military bases in the Philippines.
B.

The DoD's SpecializedImplementation Program

Bypassing the debate on the extraterritorial application of NEPA
and other U.S. federal environmental laws, the U.S. military is bound by
an alternate set of standards-the special regulations of the DoD. Much of
the United State's overseas environmental law policy is developed through
the DoD acting abroad.2 64 Overseas environmental policy has been
shaped by numerous and esoteric sources, including international
agreements, federal domestic law, executive orders, and DoD policies.2 65
Executive Order 12114 avoids the judicial quandary presented by
the legal issue of extraterritoriality.
When President Carter signed
Executive Order 12114 in 1979, he intended to further the purpose of
federal NEPA by imposing environmental impact analysis requirements
for all "major Federal actions . . . having significant effects on the
environment outside the geographical
borders of the United States, its
• ,,266
territories and possessions
Therefore, Executive Order 12114
eliminates any basis for a DoD argument that NEPA does not apply to its
overseas military installations.

261
262

See Military Bases Agreement, art. XIII, 61 Stat. at 4025.
42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii)(II) (2003). Wagner and Popovic note that "the

DoD attempts to do the opposite in the case of overseas bases, that is, to disclaim any
post-transfer obligations." Wagner & Popovic, supra note 106, at 435 n. 177.
263 See supra Part IV.
264 See Carlson, supra note 18, at 67-68.
265
266

Phelps, supra note 13, at 49-50.
Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 at § 2-1 (Jan. 4, 1979), reprinted

in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (emphasis added).
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The Department of Defense implemented Executive Order 12114
by formulating DoD Directive 6050.7. The DoD directive narrowed the
scope of "major federal actions," limiting the applicability to those federal
actions "of considerable importance involving substantial expenditures of
time, money, and resources that affects the environment on a large
267 In addition, the directive provides a broad list of
geographic 26826
scale."
.

exemptions,
including: actions taken by the President;269 actions taken
for national security;
votes and other actions in international
conferences; 27 1 actions relating to nuclear activities, material, and
waste; 272 and, even case-by-case exemptions. 273 When the DoD decides
that one of its proposed actions indeed falls within the scope of "major
federal actions" which significantly affect the environment "on a large
geographic scale," then an EIS needs to be prepared.274 Although the
term "EIS" is borrowed from NEPA, the environmental impact statement
required under the directive is significantly less stringent. According to
the directive, the DoD EIS should be "concise and no longer than
necessary to permit an informed consideration of the environmental
effects of the proposed action ...and the reasonable alternatives. 275

Executive Order 12088 imposes a supplemental duty on the U.S.
government.
The head of each Executive agency that is responsible for
the construction or operation of Federal facilities outside
the United States shall ensure that such construction or
operation complies with the environmental pollution
control standards of 2 general
applicability in the host
76
jurisdiction.
country or
267

Department of Defense Directive No. 6050.7, EnvironmentalEffects Abroad

of Major Department of Defense Actions (Mar. 31, 1979), at para. 3.5 [hereinafter DoD
Directive 6050.7].
268 Id. at encl. 2, para. E2.3.3.
269

270

Id. at encl. 2, para. E2.3.3.1.2.
Id. at encl. 2, para. E2.3.3.1.4.

Id. at encl. 2, para. E2.3.3.1.7.
272 Id. at encl. 2,para. E2.3.3.1.10.
273 Id. at encl. 2, para. E2.3.3.2.
274 Id. at para. 3.5, encl. 1, para. E1.3.1.
271

275

Id.

at encl. 1, para. E1.4.1.

See also supra note 219 (detailing EIS

requirements under NEPA).
216 Exec. Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 at § 1-801 (Oct. 13, 1978).
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In implementing Executive Order 12088, the DoD developed an official
overseas policy that ostensibly provides for very demanding
environmental protections. 277 The DoD policy requires strict adherence to
environmental laws of host countries or to U.S. laws, whichever are more
278
stringent..
The applicable laws also include any international
agreements and status of forces agreements. 279 Each department of the
DoD also has its own implementation procedures.
The Navy's
Environmental and Natural Resources Program Manual, for example,
specifically instructs that hazardous waste handling on overseas military
bases "should go beyond host country environmental standards
to ensure
280
reasonable protection to the environment and human health.
In 1992, the DoD published the Overseas Environmental Baseline
Guidance Document (OEBGD). 2 8'
Instead of a comprehensive
accumulation of U.S. laws, this handbook provides only the minimum
environmental protection standards to be observed at all overseas DoD
installations and facilities.28 2 The effect of the OEBGD is further limited
because it does not apply to operational and training deployments or to the
determination or conduct of remedial actions
to correct environmental
283
problems caused by the DoD's past activities.
The complex web of DoD rules and regulations contain a number
of loopholes, which the U.S. government has taken advantage of in order
to evade its duties to account for the environmental damage caused by the
presence of its military in the Philippines. For example, the current U.S.
presence in the Philippines is framed as a "joint" undertaking between the
284
U.S. military and the Philippine Armed Forces.
This cooperative
characteristic is stressed because it allows the United States to do three
things. First, it ameliorates the damage done to the military and security
alliance relationship by the Philippine Senate's abrasive rejection of the
1991 proposed extension to the 1947 MBA.2 85 Second, it allows the U.S.
277

See Bayoneto, supra note 13, at 137 (citing Dep't of Defense Directive No.

5100.50 (May 24, 1973, as amended) [hereinafter DoD Directive 5100.50]).
278
279

280

Id.
Id.
U.S.

GEN. ACCT. OFF., HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

CONTINUE AT OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES

14, GAO/NSIAD-91-231 (1991).

281
DEP'T. OF DEFENSE ENVTL. OVERSEAS TASK FORCE, OVERSEAS
ENVIRONMENTAL BASELINE GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (1992) [hereinafter OEBGD].
282

Phelps, supra note 13, at 67.

283

Id. (citing OEBGD, supra note 281, at 1-1).

284

See KIRK, supra note 2, at 192.

285

See id.
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troops to re-enter its former bases in the Philippines without addressing
the issue of liability for damages done prior to 1991.
Third, it permits the DoD to evade its own environmental
regulations. The designation of a "joint" military operation is critical
because of certain provisions in the DoD's overseas environmental law
policy that exempt from coverage any actions taken in conjunction with
the host nation. Executive Order 12114 requires federal agencies
engaging in major federal actions abroad to prepare an environmental
impact analysis before making decisions about any activity. 286 The strict
EIS requirement under Executive Order 12114 can be circumvented,
however, when the foreign nation is "participating" or "otherwise
involved., 287 Adhering to the non-discrimination principle means that the
United States must not treat the Philippines differently from other nations,
including itself. The United States cannot rely on the "joint" designation
to exculpate itself from liability.
In 1994, the Clinton administration, through the National Security
Council (NSC), proposed that the exclusion for major federal actions
taken in conjunction with a foreign nation be eliminated. 288 The proposal,
documented in Presidential Review Directive-23 (PRD-23), changed U.S.
foreign policy regarding joint actions that had existed since 1979.289 In
contrast to longstanding DoD policy, the NSC advocated that federal
agencies "should be mandated to ensure that environmental aspects of
their actions in foreign countries be appropriately considered, even where
a foreign country is participating in, or involved with, the particular
action.' 2 9° Critics lambasted the NSC proposal, arguing this change in

policy would put foreign relations with nations hosting U.S. activities in

286

287
28

Exec. Order 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1,957, at § 2-1 (Jan. 4, 1979).
Id. at § 2-3(b).
See George H. Brauchler, Jr., United States Environmental Policy and the

United States Army in Western Europe, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &. POL'Y 479, 491
(1994).
289 Id. at 489-90. In October 1998, the incomplete PRD-23 process had been
suspended. See Karen V. Fair, Environmental Compliance in Contingency Operations:
In Search of a Standard?, 157 MIL. L. REv. 112, 144 n.130 (1998).
290 Brauchler, supra note 288, at 491 (citing to Eileen Claussen, National
Security Council, Memorandum on PRD-23: Proposed Package (Washington, D.C., Jan.
26, 1994)) (emphasis added). "[PRD-23], 'U.S. Policy on Extraterritorial Application on
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)' was initially issued on April 8, 1993.
The purpose of a PRD is to evaluate the current status of an existing law/policy with the
intent of remedying any major weaknesses it may have. The process includes several
levels of exchange of Administration proposals and agency responses." Id. at n.1.
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jeopardy.291 One commentator suggested that lifting the exclusion for
joint activities would infringe on the host nation's sovereignty and stymie
time-sensitive military action with new bureaucratic processes.292
Although the concern for host nation sovereignty is crucial, the
joint military activities of the Philippines and the United States present
little danger of infringing sovereignty. 293 Moreover, the DoD recognizes
that maintaining the United States' international influence requires the
implementation of environmental diplomacy. 2 94 Sound environmental
diplomacy requires that the DoD practice non-discrimination in the
application of environmental regulations at its installations overseas. As
one DoD official noted, "noncompliance is potentially damaging to our
relations with the host-nation. ' 295 Initiating a comprehensive liability plan
will serve U.S. foreign policy interests. In addition, under a scheme where
the polluter pays, the benefits include deterring polluters from activities
that take unnecessary environmental risks. 296 Deterrence is one means to
achieve the goal of a better environment for the use and enjoyment of all.
VI.

A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE: TOWARDS A SOLUTION

The Philippines should look to creating new formal agreements
with the United States, incorporating the principles of international and
U.S. federal environmental law addressed above, specifically considering
the injuries done to the Philippines' public morale and environmental
resources.297 Including specific provisions regarding compensation for the
291

See, e.g., id.

292 See id.

293See supra notes 215, 243 and accompanying text.
294 See, e.g, Phelps, supra note 13, at 49.
295

id.

296

See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 197, § 4.4. "The person (or persons) who

exercise control of an activity ... by which the damage is caused (namely the operator)
should be the liable party under an [European Community] environmental liability
regime." Id. The policy behind the European Community's endorsement of the Polluter
Pays Principle is that it "ensure[s] greater caution will be applied to avoid the occurrence
of damage to the environment ...[by imposing] liability on the party responsible for an
activity that bears risks of causing such damage." Id. at 5.
297 At one time, the United States apparently considered that some concessions
to the Philippines regarding environmental regulations might be appropriate. See GAO
PHILIPPINES REPORT, supra note 3, at 30 (insisting that, had the 1991 Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation, and Security had been ratified by the Philippine Senate, the
United States would have been obliged to offer more environmental protections to the

Philippines).
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use of bases and restitution for social and environmental damage done
could provide some relief to damages to the Pilipino psyche. Negotiating
an equitable treaty would also provide a boost to the international
reputation of the Philippines, setting the stage for economic growth and
development based on internal production rather than labor export.29
The 1993 Supplementary Agreement (SA) with Germany can be
taken as a model to shape a new agreement between the Philippines and
the United States. 299 The SA covers basic expectations, namely that the
U.S. and other NATO sending nations "acknowledge the importance 3of
00
environmental protection in

.

.

.

all activities of their forces."

Specifically, the SA requires compliance with German environmental
laws; 30 1 compliance with German permit-seeking procedures for activities
on the accommodations made available for the forces; 30 2 the use of special
low-pollutant fuels, lubricants, and additives; 30 3 observation of German
In contrast to the current basing agreement [the 1947 Military
Bases Agreement], the proposed new agreement signed in August 1991
[the 1991 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security] included a
specific environmental protection provision for dealing with hazardous
and toxic waste. It would have required that the commanders of the
U.S. and Philippine forces establish an environmental program and
formulate substantive environmental protection standards governing the
disposal of hazsardous or toxic waste consistent with laws of general
applicability in the Philippines. It would also have empowered the
Philippine government to monitor and verify U.S. adherence to the
substantive standards. However, with the rejection of the agreement by
the Philippine Senate, the issue of potential liability under a new
agreement became moot.
Id.
298 The Philippine economy derives its main sustenance from remittances sent
home by Pilipinos working overseas. See David M. Forman, Protecting Philippine
Overseas Contract Workers, 16 COMP. LAB. L.J. 26, 33 (1994); Dan Gatmaytan, Death
and the Maid: Work, Violence, and the Filipina in the InternationalLabor Market, 20
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 237 n.61 (1997); and Lori J. Pennay, Comment, The
Disproportionate Effect of the Asian Economic Crisis on Women: The Filipina
Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 427, 434 (2000).
299 German SA, supra note 165.
300 Id. art. 54A, para. 1. "The sending States recognize and acknowledge the
importance of environmental protection in the context of all the activities of their forces
within the Federal Republic." Id.
301 See id. art. 53, para. 1.
302 Id. art. 53A, para. 1.
303 Id. art. 54B. Article 54B provides:
The authorities of a force of a civilian component shall ensure
that only fuels, lubricants and additives that are low-pollutant in
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emission control standards; 30 4 and conformity with German standards on
the transport of hazardous waste. 305 Most critical, however, is U.S.
acquiescence to a liability regime based on the Polluter Pays Principle.
Article 63 contains a provision that assigns responsibility for remediating
hazardous substance contamination to the sending State (here the United

States):
A force or civilian component shall in accordance with this
paragraph bear costs arising in connection with the
assessment, evaluation and remedying of hazardous
substance contamination caused by it and that exceeds
then-applicable legal standards. . . . The authorities of the
force or of the civilian component shall pay these costs as
expeditiously as feasible consistent with the availability of
funds and the fiscal
procedures of the Government of the
3 06
State.
sending
Important to note is that the substantive obligations that the United States
voluntarily assumes under this provision of the SA are similar to the
accordance with German environmental regulations are used in the
operation of aircraft, vessels and motor vehicles, insofar as such use is
compatible with the technical requirements of such aircraft, vessels and
motor vehicles.
They shall further ensure that, with respect to
passenger and utility motor vehicles, especially in the case of new
vehicles, the German rules and regulations for the limitation of noise
and exhaust gas emissions shall be observed to the extent this is not
excessively burdensome. The competent German authorities and the
authorities of the force and of the civilian component shall consult and
cooperate closely in the application and supervision of these provisions.
Id.
304

Id.

305

Id. art. 57, para. 3. Article 57, paragraph 3 provides in relevant part:

A force, a civilian component, their members and dependents shall,
unless otherwise provided in the present Agreement, observe...
regulations on the transport of hazardous material. Observance of such
regulations shall be supervised by the competent authorities. In order
to facilitate the control of the observance of these regulations, this
supervision may be conducted jointly.
Id.
306 Id.
art. 63, para. 8bis(b). The clause limiting remediation to "available
funds" was included at the insistence of U.S. negotiators. Wes Erickson, Highlights of
the Amendments to the Supplementary Agreement, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1993, at 14, 22
(1993).
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obligations to assess and remediate environmental contamination under
federal CERCLA.3 °7
The provisions regarding the environment in the German SA
established a baseline in U.S. overseas environmental policy. The
international law principle of non-discrimination does not allow the
United States to continue the disparate treatment between nations hosting
its troops. At the very least, the United States should be held accountable
to its own environmental standards. 3 08 Extraterritorial application of
federal environmental safety standards is not an unreasonable expectation.
Finally, Congress does have the power to create legislation with
extraterritorial application in mind. For example, DoD Dependent
Schools overseas must adhere to the requirements of the Asbestos School
Hazard Abatement Act of 1984.309 Drafting legislation with the clear
intent of extraterritorial application-in line with Executive Order 12114,
for example-eliminates the confusion with which NEPA litigation has
been preoccupied. The U.S. government will reap the benefits of pursuing
these types of policies. Many DoD insiders predict that the era of laissezfaire international environmental policies is coming to a close.3 10 These
scholars suggest that in order to retain its position as a respected world
power, the U.S. military, in particular, must make a determined effort
towards implementing
environmental stewardship and environmental
31 1
practices.
diplomacy
To that end, upon entering into negotiations with the United States
regarding new Terms of Reference for the Balikatan 2003-1 exercises, the
Philippine government should, at the very least, demand promises that the
U.S. government will accept full responsibility for the environmental
impacts of the current joint exercises.
These demands are not
extraordinary. The United States has status of forces agreements with
seventy-seven other nations, some with very strict environmental
312
guidelines
and States,
liabilitytheschemes.
allyto and
intimate
friend
of the United
PhilippinesAshasa longtime
every right
demand
equitable
307
308

See supra at Part V.A.2.
See generally Bayoneto, supra note

13 (asserting that U.S. federal

regulations provide the most relevant guide in assessing U.S. obligations to the
Philippines for the environmental damages at Subic and Clark).
309
See Phelps, supra note 13, at 49-52 (citing Asbestos School Hazard
Abatement Act of 1984, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4022 (West Supp. 1996) and Lead-Based
Paint Poisoning Prevention Act of 1971, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4821-4846 (West 1995)).
310 See Carlson, supra note 18; Phelps, supra note 13, at 49.
311 See Phelps, supra note 13, at 49.
312

See supra Part IV.A and accompanying notes.
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treatment comparable to other countries. Just as the Philippines has
benefited from U.S. money, patronage, and protection, so has the United
States benefited from the use and continuing access to Philippine lands
and resources. Furthermore, any good that the Pilipino people have been
able to cull from the U.S. military occupation does not discharge the duty
of the United States to remedy the contamination of the land caused by its
military activity.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Pilipinas kong minumutya,
Pugad ng luha ko't dalita,
Aking adhika
Makita kang sakdal laya.
The Philippines that I love/ Nest of tears and hardship/My dream/
Is to set you free.
Working "shoulder to shoulder" in today's international arena
should signify more than a single-minded, defense-oriented preoccupation
with maintaining military alliances. For some time now, U.S. government
and military officials have recognized that operating bases around the
world requires attending to the environmental concerns of host States.
This is simply good diplomatic policy. The United States may be entitled
to protect legitimate security interests by stationing U.S. soldiers around
the world, but the United States must no longer ignore the duty it owes to
host nations like the Philippines to prevent environmental damages that
result from its military presence. If the United States can acknowledge the
duty to do no harm, it cannot deny the responsibility to provide for
remediation in the event of an accident. These legal mandates emanate
from both international law and U.S. domestic statutory and case law. The
bilateral plan currently in place with Germany indicates that the two
goals-security and environmentalism-are not incompatible.
A clear and comprehensive set of legal obligations to protect
Philippine interests must be imposed on the United States. The current
presence of U.S. military troops in the Philippines provides the
opportunity for both nations to reflect on damages done and create
solutions to repair those injuries. At no time is the need to establish an
environmental liability regime for the Philippines more urgent than now,
when 1,000 U.S. troops are again preparing to enter the Philippines.
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